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I. Introduction 
The American decision to remove the Taliban government from power 
suddenly opened a window of opportunity for the resolution of the 
long Afghan conflict.1 The resulting United Nations brokered settle-
ment and the subsequent reconstruction process remained in many re-
spects a sui generis mission. Partly this is due to the peculiar nature of 
the Afghan conflict, which required a particularly careful, non-intrusive 
approach. Also of importance is, however, that the peace process has 
run parallel – and often been subservient – to the ongoing American-led 
“war on terror”. 
These two factors, namely Afghan sensibilities and American mili-
tary necessities, have affected the peace process in numerous ways and 
required a number of carefully orchestrated compromises. The conces-
sions that have been necessary in this respect have been forcefully de-
cried by both domestic and international non-governmental organiza-
tions and the media, focusing in particular on the continued heavy in-
volvement of former warlords in the government, the lack of security, 
and the international unwillingness to extent robust peace-keeping be-
yond Kabul.2 While much of this criticism is logically consistent, and 
                                                           
1 The period prior to the American intervention is well described in A. 
Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia, 
2000, Chapter 1. 
2 The authorization for an expansion of the ISAF mandate to allow a de-
ployment of ISAF troops outside of Kabul was accorded through 
S/RES/1510 (2003) of 13 October 2003. Until February 2005 a total of five 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) had been deployed to cities in the 
North. An expansion to the West is planned, but until now wide parts of 
the country are still insecure. 
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normatively plausible, it does not take into account the existing political 
and military realities that heavily constrain the limits within which a 
political settlement can be pursued. 
The main contribution of the United Nations and its chief represen-
tative Brahimi in the Bonn process was the brokering of what can be 
argued to constitute a consensus of the elite. By including power hold-
ers prominently in the process, and by letting them partake in the 
“spoils of peace”, strong incentives were created against a continuation 
of factional violence. We do not argue here that the role of the interna-
tional community and the United Nations has been without reproach. 
But all criticism must take into account the structure of constraint 
which severely limits what can realistically be expected.3 
We argue in this paper that given the limitations of the historical 
context and the realities of power and interests – both within the Coali-
tion and the militias – progress could only be achieved if these forces 
were brought into the process, not by working against the realities on 
the ground. 
1. Common Misperceptions 
Much commentary about Afghanistan is based on a set of assumptions 
that on closer examination does not hold up to scrutiny. These assump-
tions centre on the assessment of the impact of war and domestic con-
flict on the state and on the characterization of the conflict as an ethnic 
one. The nature of the internationally brokered settlement process is of-
ten also misunderstood and will be addressed further on in this paper. 
a. Did the Conflict destroy the State? 
Many reports, especially emanating from the NGO community, begin 
by restating the destruction of state and society during 23 years of war.4 
While this is in itself an accurate description, it is often implied, some-
times explicitly, sometimes implicitly, that the main task is one of re-
                                                           
3 J.L. Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold 
War”, International Security 19 (1992/93), 5 et seq. fn. 142. 
4 “Mehr als 20 Jahre Bürgerkrieg haben in Afghanistan nicht nur die Infra-
struktur des Landes, sondern auch sämtliche öffentlichen und sozialen In-
stitutionen zerstört,” M. Klinger, Bericht Gutachter Einsatz Afghanistan, 
GTZ, 2002, 1. 
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construction of state institutions. More accurate, however, seems the 
notion that even before the war the Afghan state was exceedingly weak 
and not properly equipped for the administration of the country and 
the delivery of services to its citizens. Using cautious diplomatic lan-
guage, this point is stressed in a recent UN study with regard to the jus-
tice sector and applies mutatis mutandis to the entire Afghan state 
structure: 
“It is frequently stated that the formal justice system has been ‘to-
tally destroyed’ by the 23 years of civil unrest and war. This is an 
imprecise perception/assessment of the situation. It does not con-
sider the role and functioning of the existing mechanisms and prac-
tices; imprecise because the formal legal tradition and mechanisms 
are much less consolidated than usually presumed.”5 
International assistance to the Afghan transitional process must 
therefore not “merely” aim at reconstructing governmental structures, 
but must start from the assumption that effective governance in the 
modern sense has never existed, even before the war. This not only 
makes the task a more formidable one, but also mandates a much more 
careful interaction with dispersed power holders. It is thus not the re-
construction of formerly existing state structures that we are faced with, 
but in some sense the initial act of creation of the political community 
that transcends pre-modern ethnic, linguistic, religious and geographic 
loyalties. 
In this respect it is useful to distinguish between the external and in-
ternal aspects of statehood. While Afghanistan’s external sovereignty 
has been largely6 uncontroversial since 1919, internal state sovereignty 
                                                           
5 M. Toscano-Rivalta/ A. Drury, Securing Afghanistan’s Future – Considera-
tions on Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice System – Pro-
posal for a Long-term Strategic Framework, UNAMA, 2004, 4, emphasis 
added. 
6 A Council of Ministers in accordance with article 100 of the 1990 Afghan 
Constitution (http://www.afghangovernment.com/Constitution1990.htm), 
led by the former President Burhunuddin Rabbani, was internationally 
recognized as the sole representative of the Afghan State. For details see R. 
Wolfrum/ C. Philipp, “The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and 
Rights under International Law”, Max Planck UNYB 6 (2002), 559 et seq. 
(567, 576, 577). The wisdom of the decision of the majority of the interna-
tional community to withhold recognition from the de facto Taliban gov-
ernment, which referred to itself as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and 
which held 90 per cent of the territory, has been much debated, especially 
given the fact that Rabbani did not even control the remaining ten per cent 
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is an altogether different matter. At no point in Afghan history did the 
state provide the only, or even the main forum for the resolution of dis-
putes. Even before armed conflict broke out in 1978 the standardization 
and formalization of the Afghan state had barely begun. Starting from 
Weber’s influential definition of statehood as: 
“a compulsory political association with continuous organisation 
whose administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the mo-
nopoly of the legitimate use of force in enforcement of its orders in 
a given territorial unit”,7 
it becomes debatable whether it is possible to say that an effective 
Afghan state has ever existed.8 The process set in motion by the fall of 
the Taliban regime concerns thus not merely the reconstruction of a 
formerly intact institutional structure, but the far more ambitious pro-
ject of the initial negotiation of the original social contract that estab-
lishes the state as the locus of sovereignty. 
As a caveat, institutional weakness should not be misunderstood as 
the complete absence of institutions. Many international commentators 
and experts charged with “capacity building” and “institutional devel-
opment”9 start from the assumption that all state structures had been 
“totally destroyed.” They thus conclude that ready-made administra-
                                                           
fully. It must be noted, however, that the failure of a new government of a 
state – in this case the Taliban – to secure recognition from other subjects 
of international law does not destroy the international personality of that 
state, nor does it absolve the respective state from observing treaty obliga-
tions entered into previously; see Sir R. Jennings/ Sir A. Watts (eds), Op-
penheim’s International Law, Vol. I, Peace, Introduction and Part 1, 9th 
edition, 1992, § 44. See also preambular para. 7 Bonn Agreement. 
7 M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, 1947, 154; see 
also F. Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century, 2004, 6; D. Chagnollaud, Droit constitutionnel contemporain, 
1999, 6. 
8 On the link between statehood and the state’s ability to use violence to en-
force its decisions see also D. Held, Political Theory and the Modern State: 
Essays on State, Power and Democracy, 1989; A. Giddens, The Nation State 
and Violence, 1985. 
9 Both terms have been used so indiscriminately that they have come to 
symbolize the vacuity of much UN terminology. While such technical 
terms describing a highly complex reality can make sense as abbreviations 
in an informed discourse among those who are aware of the complexities 
involved, they can quickly become meaningless placebos if they adorn pro-
ject documents as substitutes for real action. 
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tive blueprints from abroad can be imported and grafted onto the rem-
nants of the existing state structures. 
When dealing with international assistance given towards the recon-
struction of the state, we thus need to have realistic expectations about 
what can be achieved, given the endemic weakness the state tradition-
ally had. Nevertheless, any such assistance needs to take into account 
the local conditions and organizational habits that even these weak in-
stitutions were able to form. 
b. Was it an Ethnic Conflict? 
Afghanistan is a perplexingly diverse country with a large number of 
different ethnic groups separated by ethnicity, religion, language, and 
geography. There are at least four major ethnic groups (Pashtus, Tajiks, 
Hazaras, Usbeks), and countless smaller ones; in addition to the two 
major languages (Pashtun and Dari, a form of Persian) a bewildering ar-
ray of other languages are spoken (Turkic languages, Arabic, Nuristani, 
Dravidian, etc.).10 While almost the entire population is Muslim,11 there 
are important divisions between the Sunni and Shi’ite branches.12 
But while “a large number of Afghans feel bound by strong norms 
of reciprocity linking them to their ethnic fellows”,13 and while in the 
absence of strong competing claims on their loyalties on behalf of the 
                                                           
10 E. Orywal (ed.), Die ethnischen Gruppen Afghanistans: Fallstudien zu 
Gruppenidentitäten und Intergruppenbeziehungen, 1986; P. Snoy, “Die 
ethnischen Gruppen”, in: P. Bucherer-Dietschi/ C. Jentsch (eds), Afghani-
stan Ländermonografie, 1986, 121 et seq. 
11 There are small Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh minorities. The small erstwhile 
Jewish minority has left the country in its entirety and there are no signifi-
cant numbers of Christians, the only church in the country being the one 
attached to the Italian embassy. 
12 On the Shi’ite minority see inter alia K. Ferdinand, “Preliminary Notes on 
Hazara Culture – The Danish Scientific Mission to Afghanistan 1953-55”, 
Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser Udgivet af det Kongelige Danske Viden-
skabernes Selskab 37 (1959); H. Emadi, “The Hazaras and their Role in the 
Process of Political Transformation of Afghanistan”, Central Asian Survey 
16 (1997), 363 et seq.; S.A. Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan – An His-
torical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study, 1998. 
13 C. Johnson, et al., Afghanistan’s Political and Constitutional Development, 
Overseas Development Institute, 2003, <www.odi.org.uk/hpg/ 
evaluations.html>. 
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state14 these ethnic links have remained dominant, the characterization 
of the Afghan conflict as an ethnic one is misleading. To be sure, the 
main armed formations throughout the conflicts were organized along 
ethnic lines,15 including some of the Soviet-backed communist govern-
ment (General Dustum’s Usbek militia for instance). Once the attempt 
to form a successor government in 1992 failed, these ethnically organ-
ized armed formations quickly turned onto each other. 
But to infer from the existence of ethnic diversity and the observed 
fact of inter-ethnic violence that the conflict has been caused by ethnic-
ity is a misleading oversimplification.16 More accurately, we can observe 
that a conflict that has political and social roots gradually became “eth-
nified” where ethnic identities were successfully used to mobilize mate-
rial and manpower resources for a conflict waged for essentially oppor-
tunistic reasons.17 
Alternative explanatory hypotheses focus on the destabilizing im-
pact of the breakdown of security structures that suddenly pit individu-
als and groups against each other in a situation of anarchy.18 Without 
overarching authority, and in a situation of great uncertainty about each 
                                                           
14 A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 1986; R. Hardin, One for All: 
The Logic of Group Conflict, 1995. 
15 C. Schetter, “Ethnizität als Ressource der Kriegsführung”, in: C. Schetter/ 
A. Wieland-Karimi (eds), Afghanistan in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 1999, 
91 et seq. 
16 C. Schetter, Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan, 2003. 
17 C. Schetter, “Der Afghanistankrieg – Die Ethnisierung eines Konflikts”, 
Internationales Asienforum 33 (2002), 15 et seq.; A. Wimmer, “Territoriale 
Schließung und die Politisierung des Ethnischen”, in: C. Honegger (ed.), 
Grenzenlose Gesellschaft? – Verhandlungen des 29. Kongresses der Deut-
schen Gesellschaft für Soziologie, 16. Kongresses der Österreichischen Ge-
sellschaft für Soziologie und des 11. Kongresses der Schweizerischen Gesell-
schaft für Soziologie, 1999, 1200 et seq. UNDP, Afghanistan National Hu-
man Development Report 2004, Security with a Human Face: Challenges 
and Responsibilities, 2004, 100-102. 
18 The term “anarchy” is used here as a technical term as defined in interna-
tional relations theory. For a classical realist use of the term see K.A. Oye, 
“Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies”, 
World Politics 38 (1985); for a critical discussion see B. Buzan, et al., The 
Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism, 1993; for a revisionist 
account see A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization 46 (1992), 
391 et seq. 
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others’ intentions and readily available means to inflict serious damage, 
individuals and ethnic groups find themselves in a condition of pro-
nounced security dilemma.19 In this interpretation the main motivation 
is not ethnic rivalries as such, but primarily defensive motives. 
A related, but distinct hypothesis points out the proxy nature of 
many ethnic conflicts, i.e. its instrumentalization by external actors for 
self-interested reasons.20 A mutually reinforcing dynamic is created 
with the local war economy which provides tremendous personal op-
portunities for local military leaders who become strong agents in the 
perpetuation of the conflict, holding essentially their client communi-
ties hostage to their personal ambition and who have strong incentives 
to further inflame the conflict.21 An initially political conflict is thus 
turned into an ethnic one, not least due to external influence.22 The in-
volvement of external interests, both strategic and economic23, further 
sustains the conflict. 
A close reading of the intricate and highly fluid constellations of the 
Afghan conflict, characterized by countless and perpetually shifting al-
liances, counter-alliances and betrayals,24 suggests that the root cause of 
the conflict cannot be seen in immutable ethnic rivalries but in personal 
                                                           
19 E. Melander, Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma between Ethnic 
Groups in Emerging Anarchy, Department of Peace and Conflict Research 
Uppsala University, 1999. 
20 S.J. Kaufman, “An ‘International’ Theory of Inter-Ethnic War”, Review of 
International Studies 22 (1996), 22 et seq. 
21 S.J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in 
Moldova’s Civil War”, International Security 21 (1996), 108 et seq. 
22 Schetter, see note 17,  
23 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Opium 
Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem, 2003. While interna-
tional involvement has been an important contributing factor to the con-
flict, we must be circumspect about some of the more outlandish claims 
emanating from the NGO community, this holds particularly true with re-
gard to alleged Western interests in Central Asian hydrocarbon production. 
For an insightful discussion of the topic see Rashid, see note 1, although his 
conclusions about the inherent importance of Afghan access routes remain 
questionable. For a highly accusatory and ill-informed discussion of the 
same issue see G. Long/ D. Westcott, The United States’s Oil Interests and 
the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, 2003, . 
24 For an account of the conflict see Rashid, see note 1; B.R. Rubin, The Frag-
mentation of Afghanistan, 1995. 
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ambition25 and outside meddling. The opportunities offered by the war 
economy26 for some largely explain the incentive structures that drive 
civil wars, despite the unmitigated disaster that it spells for the many.27 
We must not forget in this respect that in a situation of endemic con-
flict, many of the most dynamic and entrepreneurial sections of society 
will find no other outlet for their personal ambition than to avail them-
selves of the opportunities offered by the war economy.28 
c. Was the UN too Dominant? 
A too intrusive international effort would have been perceived as for-
eign domination, and could thus have triggered the kind of violent re-
sistance that Afghans have shown throughout their history towards ex-
ternal interference. The respect shown by the international community 
towards the Afghan political process is in part a result of that history. It 
is therefore arguable that the United Nations had little choice but to 
stay consciously out of the limelight, whatever the conceptual lessons 
learned from previous missions.  
Whether it was the sui generis character of Afghanistan or a deliber-
ate strategic choice with wider implications for future missions, the 
                                                           
25 R.J.P.J. de Figueiredo/ B.R. Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: Political 
Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict”, in: J. Snyder/ R. Jervis (eds), Civil War 
and the Security Dilemma, 1997. 
26 B.R. Rubin, “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan”, 
World Development 28 (2000), 1789 et seq.; J. Goodhand, “From War 
Economy to Peace Economy? Reconstruction and State Building in Af-
ghanistan”, Journal of International Affairs 58 (2004), 155 et seq.; UNDP 
Human Development Report 2004, see note 17, 103-106. 
27 For a theoretical treatment of the role of economic incentives in sustaining 
and prolonging conflict see J. Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the Force: Eco-
nomic Foundations of Conflict Theory, 2001.Olson’s theory of collective 
action is likewise useful in this respect to account for the paradoxical fact 
that the “multitudes with an interest in peace” cannot prevail because “they 
have no lobby to match those of the ‘special interests’ that may on occasion 
have an interest in war.” M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups, 1971, 165. 
28 A. Guistozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Transition from War of All against 
All to Peace Competition in Afghanistan, London School of Economics, 
Crisis States Research Seminar, 2003, who categorizes the various “career 
paths” and personal goals of some prominent commanders; quoted in 
Goodhand, see note 26, fn. 18. 
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United Nations moved here from the more invasive approach that had 
characterized the previous missions and adopted a much more inclu-
sive, consensual approach reminiscent of its missions of the early 
1990s.29 In the on-going UN mission in Afghanistan, emphasis has been 
placed on ensuring Afghan ownership of the reconstruction process, 
rather than imposing an international administration. 
2. Unusual Characteristics 
Compared to other peace-building and peace-keeping efforts by the in-
ternational community, the Afghan peace process is characterized by a 
number of factors that are unusual in this context: the limited role 
played by the United Nations; the lack of a transitional justice compo-
nent in the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institu-
tions”30 of 5 December 2001, generally referred to as the Bonn Agree-
ment; as well as the disabling factor of the ongoing military campaign 
against terrorist groups. In this context certain non-official groups con-
tinue to receive arms and military training, while simultaneously the 
political process previews a disarmament and reintegration of the mili-
tias. 
a. UN not in the Driver’s Seat 
The United Nations has limited itself to playing a supporting role in 
Afghanistan, leaving visible leadership to Afghans. This so-called “light 
footprint” approach has been hailed as a major conceptual revolution in 
United Nation thinking, developed out of the perceived failures in 
Kosovo, East Timor and elsewhere.31 But whatever the conceptual les-
                                                           
29 Such as UN operations in Namibia, El Salvador and Cambodia. For a cur-
sory description and characterization of some of the UN post-conflict re-
construction operations since the 1990s, see J.S. Kreilkamp, “U.N. Post-
conflict Reconstruction”, N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 35 (2002 – 2003), 619 
and seq. 
30 Doc. S/2001/1154, <http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/(Symbol) 
/MISC.01.5.En?OpenDocument>. 
31 S. Chesterman, Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo,  
East Timor and Afghanistan, International Peace Academy, 2002, 
<www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/JUSTICE_UNDER_INTL.pdf>; T. 
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sons learned from previous UN missions, the peculiar Afghan situation, 
in particular the resistance to foreign domination that is borne out by 
this nation’s history, made any more intrusive international role poten-
tially highly problematic. 
While the chronology and precise nature of the UN involvement in 
Afghanistan will be discussed under III., it shall suffice to note at this 
point that despite the seemingly prominent position, its role has been 
consciously relatively limited. Partly this is due to the perceived neces-
sity of avoiding the impression of undue foreign interference, i.e. ensur-
ing “Afghan ownership”. The other reason has been the obvious impor-
tance of the American-led Coalition warfare that has run parallel to the 
peace building efforts of the United Nations. The normative and legal 
rules, as well as the strategic vision pursued by the United Nations and 
the United States, respectively, are by and large compatible, but never-
theless quite distinct. Their cooperation thus had to be managed “as 
porcupines do their love-making: very cautiously”.32 The fact that their 
respective mandates are quite separate often blinds us to the relative 
discrepancy in terms of resources and manpower which is heavily tilted 
towards the United States. 
b. Not a Settlement, but a Process 
All post-conflict reconstruction scenarios involve a process in the sense 
that gradually institutions, norms, and physical infrastructure are being 
created. In all such situations armed groups that have been locked into 
violence for a very long time need to overcome their past ethnic, ideo-
logical, class and personal differences and learn to resolve their disputes 
without recourse to violence. There are many explanations why social 
relations unravel to the point that civil war breaks out, but whatever the 
origin of the violence, what is required at the start of the reconstruction 
                                                           
Pippard, East Timor and the Challenge of UN Transitional Administration, 
United Nations Association for Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
<http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/etimor.html> which has a good discus-
sion of the impact the 2000 Brahimi Report has had on the approach taken 
in Afghanistan; S. Chesterman, “Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future 
of UN State-Building”, Survival 44 (2002), 37 et seq.; L. Brahimi, Peace-
keeping: Five Years after the Report, Statement delivered on 1 March 2005 
at the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, <www.iiea.com/images/ 
managed/events_attachments/Brahimi010305.pdf>. 
32 C. Bell, “Why an Expanded NATO must Include Russia”, in: T.G. Car-
penter (ed.), The Future of NATO, 1995, 39. 
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phase is the willingness to establish what Deutsch has termed a “secu-
rity community”, i.e. an arrangement “in which there is real assurance 
that the members of that community will not fight each other physically 
but will settle their disputes in some other way”.33 Obviously, it will 
require time to move from a situation of high levels of inter-communal 
violence towards a real assurance that despite continuing conflicts over 
divergent interests, the conflicts will be resolved through the political 
process and violence will not be used. Building the necessary levels of 
trust between the former enemies out of necessity requires time, and in 
this respect every post-conflict situation is a process and not merely a 
settlement. 
What distinguishes the Afghan situation from other post-conflict 
scenarios, however, is the absence of a formal agreement over the sub-
stantive content of the solution to the conflict: “Unlike some postwar 
agreements, the Bonn Accords set out a process, rather than a detailed 
settlement of major political issues.”34 The “classic” case of conflict 
resolution involves the signing of a peace treaty, provisional constitu-
tion, power sharing arrangement, or the like. The substantive content of 
such an agreement is “normally” negotiated over a period of months, if 
not years, and often comes at a point in time when all parties to the 
conflict have come to the conclusion that there is not much to be gained 
from continuing the armed struggle.35 
Previous mediating efforts in Afghanistan, such as the Peshawar Ac-
cords, had actually followed that model of resolving the substantive is-
sues and distributing power as part of the formal settlement. The situa-
tion in November 2001, however, was very different. Here the parties 
were brought together to negotiate a framework under extreme time 
pressure, while an external power had come in as an active and partisan 
participant in the conflict. Thus the Bonn negotiations resulted in very 
                                                           
33 K. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 1957, 
5, emphasis added. 
34 B.R. Rubin, Afghanistan’s New Constitution, 2004, 2. 
35 Luttwark makes this point in his controversial essay when he cautions 
against international interventions into ongoing domestic conflicts, arguing 
that sometimes the underlying conflict either needs to be resolved militar-
ily, or that the parties must “grow tired” of war. Otherwise any interna-
tional intervention just provides breathing space in which to recuperate and 
rearm, and thus prolongs the conflict. See E.N. Luttwak, “Give War a 
Chance”, Foreign Aff. 4 (1999), 36 et seq. 
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few substantive issues being settled, but rather concentrated on laying 
down the time-table and the overall framework in which to proceed.36  
Given the combined pressures of time and a rapidly changing mili-
tary reality, the group assembled in Bonn was of necessity less than 
completely representative of the various political and ethnic factions 
throughout Afghan society. However, Special Representative Brahimi 
repeatedly stressed “that no one would remember how unrepresenta-
tive the meeting had been if the participants managed to fashion a proc-
ess that would lead to a legitimate and representative government”.37 
By leaving most substantive issues to be decided by the two subse-
quent, and much more inclusive, Loya Jirgas as well as laying down 
clear temporal limits on the authority conferred and stressing its transi-
tional nature, the Bonn process managed to allay fears that it was meant 
to ossify a transitory power constellation. 
c. No Transitional Justice Component 
The term “transitional justice” refers to the processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of 
large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice 
and achieve reconciliation.38 In the majority of post-conflict scenarios, 
the belligerent parties are brought together in a political process in the 
course of which they are able to agree to some form of legitimate proc-
ess to lay to rest the allegations about past misconduct leveled against 
each other.39 In the Bonn process, however, of the four groups repre-
sented, only one, the Northern Alliance (Islamic United Front for the 
Salvation of Afghanistan), actually had armed forces on the ground, and 
these were engaged in combat not against the other participants but 
against the Taliban who were not represented at the negotiations. The 
quid pro quo that fuels the necessary dynamic of concessions and 
counter-concessions was thus absent in Bonn. 
                                                           
36 B.R. Rubin, “Transitional justice and human rights in Afghanistan – First 
Anthony Hyman Memorial Lecture at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies London”, International Affairs 79 (2003), 567 et seq. (570). 
37 Rubin, see note 34, 4. 
38 Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 
in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, Doc. S/2004/616 of 23 August 2004, 
para. 4. 
39 For example, see the case studies on Sierra Leone, East Timor and Bosnia-
Herzegovina in this Volume. 
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Furthermore, through their previous actions the Taliban had gradu-
ally placed themselves “beyond the pale”. At least since the Taliban’s 
refusal to comply with S/RES/1333 after the 11 September attacks, the 
international community no longer saw them as a legitimate partner in 
any negotiations. The Northern Alliance that was now allied with the 
Coalition in fighting them, was thus under no political obligation to 
agree to an investigation into its own past behavior. 
Suggestions at Bonn about requiring the screening of new recruits 
into the national army and police to prevent candidates who had been 
guilty of war crimes came to no fruition because there was no judicial 
or similar process to determine who was ineligible, and, more impor-
tantly, because the ongoing policy of the Americans of arming North-
ern Alliance units to fight Taliban and al Qaeda created de facto forces 
without any such requirements. Similar suggestions about prohibiting a 
general amnesty for war crimes, or to prohibit the membership of 
commanders guilty of war crimes in the government were met with fu-
rious resistance. Similar resistance was very much in evidence during 
the Emergency Loya Jirga. 
The lack of relevant regulations to deal with past abuses reflects the 
fact that some of the Afghan leaders40 who signed the Bonn Agreement 
are widely believed to have been responsible for war crimes and thus 
had no interest in including transitional justice regulations in the Bonn 
Agreement. This shortcoming was already anticipated by Brahimi in his 
report to the Security Council: 
“The provisional institutions whose creation is suggested will not 
include every one who should be there and it may include some 
whose credentials many in Afghanistan may have doubts about. 
Please remember that what is hopefully to be achieved is the elusive 
peace … the broad based interim administration is the beginning, 
not the end of the road”.41 
From this realist point of view, involving potential spoilers in the 
process rather than having them fighting against it may be well worth 
the price of compromising principles, at least for a transitional period.42 
                                                           
40 ICG, Asia Report No. 45, Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional 
Justice of 28 January 2003, 17. 
41 L. Brahimi, “Briefing to the Security Council, Transcript from 13 No-
vember 2001”, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/brahimi-sc-
briefing.htm>, emphasis in the original. 
42 Karzai’s reluctant removal of some local commanders, most publicized that 
of Esmail Khan from his fiefdom in Herat, has been criticized as endanger-
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In the meantime, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Com-
mission (AIHRC) has been charged with the responsibility of finding a 
way to account for the past. It conducted a national consultation in or-
der to determine how a process of transitional justice could be struc-
tured in Afghanistan, and has made some proposals in accordance with 
the results of the survey. This will be discussed in more detail further 
on. 
d. Simultaneous Arming and (half-hearted) Demobilization 
Recovering from decades of armed conflict and managing the transition 
to a peaceful and stable post-war order is contingent on the successful 
disarmament and demobilization of armed groups and their reintegra-
tion into civilian life and the political process. The importance of dis-
armament, demobilization and reintegration (the so called DDR, as it is 
commonly abbreviated) is widely acknowledged,43 and it has become a 
“standard response to situations of post conflict”.44 
But despite the inherent importance of the concept and the vital role 
it is understood to play in the transition towards peace,45 the Bonn 
Agreement does not explicitly mention DDR but merely stipulates that: 
“upon the transfer of power, all mujahedin, Afghan armed forces 
and armed groups in the country shall come under the command 
                                                           
ing the Bonn process. While this removal was motivated primarily by eco-
nomic considerations (transferal of customs duties to the central govern-
ment), the dangers outlined apply mutatis mutandis for such action moti-
vated by considerations of transitional justice. See C. Schetter, “Auswei-
tung der Kampfzone”, Financial Times Deutschland of 17 September 2004, 
38. 
43 A. Özerdem, “DDR of former combatants in Afghanistan”, Third World 
Quarterly 23 (2002), 961 and seq.; E. Gotab, Challenges of Peace Opera-
tions: Into the 21st Century: Concluding Report 1997-2002, 2002. 
44 G. Wood, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Marriage 
of D’s and R’s?”, The Networker, March 2005, <http://www.bond. 
org.uk/networker/march05/ddr.htm>.  
45 Report of the Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, Doc. 
A/55/985-S/2001/574 of 7 June 2001, para. 23; Report of the Secretary-
General, The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, De-
mobilization and Reintegration, Doc. S-2000/101 of 11 February 2000, 
para. 1; United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Op-
erations, Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, paras 7, 54. 
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and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according 
to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces”.46 
These groups referred to in the Bonn Agreement have been reorgan-
ized and formally recognized as the Afghan Military Forces (AMF).47 
Many armed factions, however, are not classified as AMF units, and 
therefore do not fall under the DDR process. Furthermore, the Ameri-
can-led Coalition has relied extensively on local militias in the execu-
tion of its campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda. These allied mili-
tias are generally not classified as AMF units, and have only very 
strained links to the central government and receive substantial military 
and financial resources from the Coalition. 
The paradox of the UN and the central government trying to dis-
band some factions, while the Coalition is actively arming others creates 
obvious problems for the transition process, which are described in 
somewhat greater detail later in this article. 
II. Background 
Afghanistan belongs to the handful non-European states that have 
never been colonized.48 While its exposed location between the British 
and Russian Empires invited external interference, and while the defi-
nite borders of the country were largely the result of the interests of 
these two imperial powers, it must be stressed that at no point was any 
meaningful external presence in the country established. The often used 
characterization of Afghanistan as a “buffer state” is not inaccurate in 
the sense that it separated the two empires,49 but the implication that 
the country as such is a colonial construct is a misleading one. 
With the possible exception of the Pashtunistan question, ethnic di-
versity in Afghanistan and the existence of trans-border ethnic kinship 
networks cannot be seen as the result of colonial meddling – as has been 
the case in many African countries. At any rate the conflict must not be 
                                                           
46 Section V (1) of the Bonn Agreement. 
47 ICG, Asia Briefing No. 35, Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on 
Track of 23 February 2005, 2. 
48 The others are Japan, Iran, Thailand, Ethiopia, Mongolia, Nepal, Bhutan 
and China; some include Liberia. 
49 This is most clearly reflected in the unusual shape of the country, in par-
ticular the north-eastern “finger” of the Wakhan Corridor. 
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seen simply as the expression of ethnic rivalry that could have been 
avoided if the political borders had corresponded better to ethnic reali-
ties. It is not easily conceivable how, given the extreme ethnic diversity 
and the widely interspersed settlement patterns, political and adminis-
trative units could be devised with ethnic representation in mind. 
1. History of the State 
Afghanistan looks back onto a very old and eventful history, having 
fallen at various times under Persian, Greek, Mongol, and Indian influ-
ence.50 The political organization of the territory was very much domi-
nated by its geographic location.51 The first Afghan state was created in 
1747 when Ahmad Khan Abdali proclaimed himself king. 
By 1707 there had already been a rebellion against Persian rule dur-
ing which Mirwais Hotaki seized Kandahar and had himself proclaimed 
king by a Loya Jirga52 summoned for this occasion.53 This attempt 
proved, however, short-lived, and it was only the internal collapse of 
the Persian Empire that created the opening for the establishment of an 
Afghan state. Because no historical precedent for Afghan statehood ex-
isted, recourse was had in both 1707 and in 1747 to the traditional Pash-
tun instrument of a Loya Jirga to legitimize rule.54 This state was 
founded on the consent of Pashtun tribal leaders who were brought to-
                                                           
50 For a short overview see G. Moltmann, “Die Verfassungsentwicklung Af-
ghanistans von 1901 bis 1986”, Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts 35 (1986), 
509 et seq. (516-519). For a more extensive treatment refer to O. Caroe, 
The Pathans, 1962; L. Dupree, Afghanistan, 1973; M. Klimburg, Afghani-
stan, 1966, Chapters I-III; K. Jäckel, “5000 Jahre Geschichte”, in: W. Kraus 
(ed.), Afghanistan, 1975; G. Macmunn, Afghanistan – From Darius to 
Amanullah, 1929. 
51 Rubin, see note 24, 19, which provides a very succinct and insightful his-
torical placement. 
52 The Pashtu term Loya Jirga (grand/great assembly/council) refers to a cen-
tury-old forum, in which tribal elders came together to consult and decide 
on conflicts, social reforms, or other important issues. 
53 R. Bachardoust, Afghanistan – Droit constitutionnel, histoire, régimes poli-
tiques et relations diplomatiques depuis 1747, 2003, 18 et seq. 
54 For more details see S.Q. Reshtia, “La Loya Jerga”, Central Asian Survey 
VII (1988), 6 et seq. 
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gether in the Loya Jirga, and the very term “Afghan” remained for a 
long time synonymous for “Pashtun”.55 
This first state was decidedly pre-modern in the sense that it was 
built upon the existing tribal loyalties and laws, mimicking on the “na-
tional” level the traditional power structure of personified leadership 
complemented by a council of elders that existed on all levels of Pash-
tun tribal organization.56 This foundation of the Afghan state on Pash-
tun tribal tradition is interesting for two reasons. First, the absence of 
any explicit religious reference is noteworthy:57 
“En effet, aucun mollah n’y était présent en tant que tel. Aucune rè-
gle religieuse n’a été retenue pour encadrer le processus de désigna-
tion du roi. La Loya Jirga ne donna aucun titre religieux à l’heureux 
élu; il n’est appelé ni émir ni calife ni commandeur des croyants, 
mais tout simplement roi”.58 
Secondly, tribal tradition saw the jirga as the embodiment of the 
“sovereign” power of the community, being the carrier of both “legisla-
tive”59 and adjudicating powers. The leader on each hierarchical level, 
the khan, was seen as the “executive power of the community subject to 
the will of the collectivity and the customary law of the tribe”60 to be 
elected from among the dominant family. The system has not been pe-
                                                           
55 “Die Paschtunen sind die eigentlichen Afghanen.” Moltmann, see note 50. 
Likewise, Bachardoust, see note 53, 23: “Le mot Afghan était à l’époque 
synonyme de Pashtoun.” See also C. Schetter, “Die Territorialisierung na-
tionaler und ethnischer Vorstellungen in Afghanistan”, Orient 44 (2003), 75 
et seq. 
56 Moltmann, see note 50, 515. 
57 This tradition was not lost on the Taliban who not only changed the name 
of the country to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but also chose the ti-
tle of amir al-mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), a historic title refer-
ring to the caliph, when an assembly of 1,200 ulema met in Qandahar from 
20 March to 4 April 1996 to elect Mullah Muhammad Omad as the new 
head of state. 
58 Bachardoust, see note 53, 19. 
59 The use of such quintessentially modern terms in the context of a pre-
modern society is problematic. A society dominated by an ancient tribal 
customary law such as the Pashtunwali is obviously not easily inclined to-
wards the concept of making new laws. Still the jirgas could impose new 
binding rules, which is the essence of the legislative power. 
60 Moltmann, see note 50, 515. 
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culiar to Afghanistan, and it has indeed been likened to pre-modern 
European political systems.61 
Whether this system can be seen as proto-democratic, is problem-
atic. It does, however, show the relatively weak claim to power exer-
cised by the king, who from the very beginning left the tribes largely to 
their own devices in the regulation of their internal affairs. While it is 
certainly possible to see the Loya Jirga as a loose form of parliamentary 
representation,62 the main difference lies in the fact that the Afghan 
state was never able to effectively impose taxation – with or without 
participation – onto its subjects, remaining exceedingly weak through-
out its existence. Without restating the dynastic history of the 19th cen-
tury that has been covered elsewhere,63 it shall suffice to point out that 
the main characteristics of the Afghan state was its inability, indeed un-
willingness, to impose any form of national organization or identity 
beyond keeping the royal family nominally in power. 
The absence of a nation corresponding to the state is not peculiar to 
Afghanistan, but has been a dominant characteristic particularly of Af-
rican post-colonial states.64 In Afghanistan, however, even the attempt 
to foster national unity was not undertaken as the state throughout its 
existence depended on received income in the form of external eco-
nomic and military aid and was thus not dependent on tapping national 
sources of power. What Rubin says about the reign of King Abdul 
Rahman Khan (reigned 1881-1901) is quite symptomatic of most Af-
ghan governments throughout its modern history: 
“Abdul Rahman Khan used these coercive resources to establish the 
basic state structures that endured until the fall of Najibullah in 
1992: a Pashtun ruler using external resources to reign over an ethni-
cally heterogeneous society while manipulating that social segmen-
tation to weaken society’s resistance”.65 
                                                           
61 Schwager for instance compares it to the constitution of the Germanic 
tribes, see J. Schwager, Entwicklung Afghanistans als Staat, 1932, 22 et seq. 
62 Moltmann, see note 50, 520. 
63 See the references in note 50; Rubin, see note 24, 45 et seq. provides an ex-
cellent account of the process of state formation. 
64 The uti possidetis decision of the Pan-African Congress of Addis-Ababa of 
26 May 1963 accepted the impossibility of replacing the artificial bounda-
ries drawn at the Berlin Conference of 1885, instead charging the African 
states with the task of fostering national communities beyond ethnic lines.  
65 Rubin, see note 24, 19. 
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Given the difficult terrain, most Afghans had traditionally led very 
localized lives, both physically and in terms of political loyalty. The 
conflict that erupted in 1978 and the mass exodus that ensued brought 
Afghans into contact with other Afghans from different parts of the 
country and ethnic background, often for the first time in living mem-
ory. Prior to 1978 loyalties and identities were mainly based on kinship 
ties which had only a very tenuous link to territorial units. The dual 
impact of the foreign invasion and the subsequent extreme political 
fragmentation among the mujahideen forces, which brought with it the 
very real threat of dismemberment of Afghanistan, changed the percep-
tion of the national territory among ordinary Afghans.66 Prior to 1978 
being a citizen of the Afghan state meant little to an ethnically and geo-
graphically divided population.67 It was only through the experience of 
exile and resistance that the idea of the nation as a “communauté de 
destin”68 gained ground. While ethnic divisions persist, most Afghans 
today strongly identify with the Afghan nation. Surely, in the absence 
of other meaningful political units, distributional struggles over power 
and resources continue to be expressed in ethnic terms but being part of 
the nation as such is no longer controversial for all ethnic groups. What 
successive Afghan governments failed to undertake has thus been 
achieved by default: the forging of a national identity, albeit at the cost 
of a long and painful conflict. What remains to be done, however, is the 
other major omission of all previous Afghan governments; the creation 
of an efficient state: 
“The fundamental need in Afghanistan is not nation building, as is 
so often said. … Afghanistan is a nation, though disputes over how 
to govern and share power in that nation are acute. What Afghani-
stan needs above all is assistance in building a state”.69 
In Huntington’s classic institutional definition, political order is 
maintained through stable institutions as intermediaries that moderate 
the opposing political claims made by different interest groups, social-
ize behavior and allow for negotiated outcomes. They are characterized 
by their degree of stability, the importance attached to them by actors 
                                                           
66 Schetter, see note 16. 
67 Rubin, see note 24, 22. 
68 Bachardoust, see note 53, 21; see also the discussion of the Nietzschean 
concept of “brauchbare Vergangenheit” in the article by R. Utz, in this Vol-
ume. 
69 B.R. Rubin, Statement to Implementation Group, 2002, <www.af/ 
resources/itsa/ig-october/B-Rubin-IGoct02.pdf>. 
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and thus their ability to bring about a particular type of behavior: “In-
stitutions are stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour. Organisa-
tions and procedures vary in their degree of institutionalization.”70 
In Afghanistan formal institutions barely existed; for most of its his-
tory political power was based merely on unstable, frequently changing 
personal loyalties71 that, even with respect to the royal family, never 
achieved the degree of institutionalization that, according to Hunting-
ton, can produce order. In Afghanistan very few of such recurrent, sta-
ble and valued institutions existed, the most important probably being 
the Loya Jirga which has its origin in Pashtun tribal culture as shown 
above.72  
The state as such, however, always remained extremely weak and 
did not figure prominently in the life of ordinary Afghans whose pri-
mary loyalties belonged to smaller, non-territorial groupings such as 
family, clan, and tribe. The state and its territorial space carried only a 
very abstract, often negative connotation because it only made itself felt 
through the sporadic attempt to impose levies and custom duties, mili-
tary and labor service.73 
As mentioned earlier, the weakness of the state must not be inter-
preted as the absence of law as an ordering system among Afghans. The 
expectation of empirical validity is generally backed by the threat of 
sovereign sanction, but Weber conceded that the “coercive apparatus ... 
whose special task it is ... to apply specially provided means of coercion 
(legal coercion) for the purpose of norm enforcement” need not neces-
sarily be the state, but norms can also be efficiently enforced through 
psychological as well as physical means of coercion, operating either di-
rectly or indirectly against the participants in the system.74 This defini-
                                                           
70 S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968, 12. 
71 Schetter, see note 55; C. Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Af-
ghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863), 1997; 
C. Noelle, “Es ist ein weiter Weg nach Bukhara. Raum-Zeit Koordinaten in 
der Sichtweise afghanischer Chroniken”, in: R. Haag-Higuchi/ C. Szyska 
(eds.), Erzählter Raum in Literaturen der islamischen Welt, 2001, 131 et 
seq. (76). 
72 Reshtia, see note 54. 
73 Schetter, see note 55, 80. 
74 Ibid. 
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tion is broader than the orthodox positivist account75 which depends 
solely on the threat of sovereign executive sanction to explain efficacy. 
In Afghanistan most norm enforcement relied on informal mecha-
nism not controlled by the state, such as the norms of the traditional 
tribal law of the Pashtuns (Pashtunwali) that were enforced though 
tribal councils (jirgas) at the different hierarchical levels of tribal or-
ganization. The modern state, however, that was gradually being built 
never achieved a particularly strong grasp over people’s lives. More im-
portantly, it’s use by a very small but ideologically highly motivated 
group to push through radical modernization and social change quickly 
mobilized massive resistance. The struggle that ensued between Com-
munist modernizers and a reluctant population quickly led to the com-
plete demise of those state structures that had hitherto been built. 
Rubin sums up the history of Afghan resistance as such: 
“The underlying story was about the breakdown, indeed the frag-
mentation, of social control and social power in Afghanistan. The 
painstakingly constructed state shattered when a Soviet-supported 
Communist elite tried to use that fragile apparatus as an instrument 
of massive, coercive social change”.76 
The particular tragedy of Afghanistan lies in the fact that in the 
course of the resistance not only was the state thoroughly destroyed, 
but also, due to the way external aid was channeled to various, mostly 
religiously defined groups, as well as the way the Soviet Union at-
tempted to win the counterinsurgency war, traditional sources of social 
cohesion were likewise seriously affected. Towards the end of the Soviet 
occupation, the country was left with no legitimate government, no na-
tional leadership, a secular intelligenzia that had been very small to be-
gin with, but had been so diminished by successive purges as to be no 
longer existent, multiple competing armed factions in virtually every 
locality of the country, and with massive population displacements. 
                                                           
75 In the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition this is most often identified with Aus-
tin’s “command theory” which states that real law needs an enforcing sov-
ereign, and that, therefore, international law cannot be regarded as law at 
all, but merely as non-binding morality, J. Austin, The Province of Juris-
prudence Determined, 1832 (208). Hart in his restatement of legal positiv-
ism reaffirms essentially the same position in slightly more accommodating 
terms by defining a full legal system as consisting of “primary” and “sec-
ondary” rules, the latter being those that determine how the former are 
created, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 1994 [1961]. 
76 Rubin, see note 24, preface page x (sic). 
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Thus, not only was the weak state destroyed, but also the traditional 
society was heavily affected. 
2. Civil Society 
As in virtually every other post-conflict scenario there has been a heavy 
emphasis on strengthening “civil society” in Afghanistan.77 
The term defies easy classification, but there seems to be some con-
sensus that it comprises those social relations based on the association 
of people independently of the state and the family, thus being com-
posed of voluntary associations that allow “citizens to protect them-
selves from the state and also influence it through associative life”.78 
From its inception in the Scottish enlightenment to dissident move-
ments in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond, use of the concept 
has always started from the assumption of a strong state against which 
protection and means of influence were sought.79 
Civil society is thus something that is defined in opposition to the 
state.80 However, the problem of transition from an authoritarian police 
state to a liberal democratic polity81 radically differs from the creation 
of functioning state structures in the first place. In the latter the chal-
lenge lies in strengthening the state as such, because only the state can 
act as a guarantee against domestic anarchy. 
                                                           
77 M. Ottaway/ T. Carothers (eds), Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and 
Democracy Promotion, 2000. 
78 G. Wylie, Dysfunctional Societies are not Civil Societies ... Or are They?, 
Conference of Civil Society, University of Belfast, 2004, 2. 
79 See inter alia J. Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, 1998; R. 
Hefner (ed.), Democratic Civility: The History and Cross-Cultural Possibil-
ity of a Modern Political Ideal, 1998; J. Cohen/ A. Arato, Civil Society and 
Political Theory, 1992; Z. Pelczynski, The State and Civil Society: Studies in 
Hegel’s Political Philosophy, 1984. 
80 A. Arato, “Civil Society versus the State”, Telos 47 (1981), 23 et seq.; M. 
Bernhard, “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central 
Europe”, Political Science Quarterly 108 (1993), 307 et seq. 
81 M. Kaldor/ I. Vejvoda, Democratisation in Central and East European 
Countries, 1997; J.J. Linz/ A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
Europe, 1996. 
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As we have argued above, formal instruments of governance have 
always remained embryonic in an exceedingly weak Afghan state. But 
weak as it might have been, the state at the very least provided the 
framework in which traditional forms of societal organization could 
function. The ensuing conflict destroyed both the state and much of the 
informal arrangements that had ordered life for ordinary Afghans. The 
problem here is not an overly oppressive, intrusive state but its very ab-
sence. 
3. Political Society 
Inflationary use of the term “civil society” has, unfortunately, deprived 
it of much of its explanatory significance. In the sense conceived by 
Gramsci, civil society is but the complement to “political society”, and 
it is the original creation of the latter that we are faced with in Afghani-
stan today, namely the creation of effective coercive instruments to em-
power the state to take and enforce decisions.82 The naïve insistence on 
giving support to “civil society” forgets that without order institutions 
cannot function, disregarding for the moment that in the Afghan con-
text the very concept of liberal institutions appears problematic. This 
point is echoed by Goodhand:  
                                                           
82 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1971, 352. Important in 
this respect is his concept of cultural or intellectual hegemony as a vital 
complement to material coercive power. Any system of power is based on 
the existence of coercive power. Much more effective, however, is exercis-
ing power through the consent of the ruled, which is achieved through cul-
tural hegemony that effectively precludes the very conceptualizing of alter-
native power structures, thereby producing legitimacy and deference: “To 
the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalised by the popula-
tion it becomes part what is generally called “common sense” so that the 
philosophy, culture and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the 
natural order of things,” B. Burke, “Antonio Gramsci and informal educa-
tion”, The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education, 2004, <http://www. 
infed.org/thinkers/et-gram.htm>. The dual dynamic of coercion and con-
sent implicit in all power relations is reflected in Gramsci’s division be-
tween political society which represents the coercive institutions such as 
army, police, judiciary, bureaucracy, etc. and civil society which comprises 
non-coercive public institutions such as churches, schools, trade unions, 
political parties, cultural associations, etc. In this rather subtle theory of 
power the task of civil society is to further the dominant normative vision 
that supports the status quo distribution of material power.  
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“there is no getting away from the fact that state building involves 
the deployment of raw power and not simply the creation of liberal 
institutions. … A strong state is required in order to accelerate eco-
nomic development and poverty reduction, consolidate peace, re-
duce the scope for extreme brutality and exploitation of social rela-
tions and withstand the intrusive interest of regional powers”.83 
Why states fail, or more accurately in the case of Afghanistan, fail to 
form is a highly complex issue outside the scope of the present paper.84 
In Afghanistan we need to acknowledge the fact that the creation of 
state institutions did not always keep pace with the claims to sover-
eignty extended by the central ruler. 
III. The Path to the Bonn Agreement  
1. Previous UN Involvement 
The UN had been active in Afghanistan even before the conflict broke 
out. It was engaged in normal development assistance work. In re-
sponse to the Soviet intervention, the Security Council met in 1980 to 
consider an appropriate response but a draft resolution faltered due to 
the Soviet veto and the issue was referred to the General Assembly 
which debated it in an Emergency Special Session on Afghanistan 
which lasted for five days, from 10-14 January 1980,85 resulting in the 
first of a series of annual resolutions.86 In addition, from 1985 on the 
                                                           
83 Goodhand, see note 26, 168, 167. 
84 For a preliminary discussion see, inter alia, R.I. Rotberg (ed.), When States 
Fail: Causes and Consequences, 2004; R.I. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and 
State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 2003; W.I. Zartman (ed.), Collapsed 
States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, 1995. 
85 S/RES/462 (1980) of 9 January 1980, calling on the General Assembly to 
examine certain questions contained in Doc. S/Agenda/2185. 
86 Doc. ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, General Assembly – Sixth Emergency 
Special Session “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter-
national peace and security.”. The following resolutions carry the same ti-
tle. A complete list of the annual resolutions can be found at <http://www. 
unama-afg.org/docs/_UN%20Docs/_sc/resolutions.htm >. 
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General Assembly began to look into the human rights situation87 re-
sulting in a series of annual resolutions on human rights.88 Throughout 
the period of the conflict humanitarian assistance was being provided 
by the respective UN agencies,89 harmonized by the Coordinator for 
UN Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs as Operation 
Salam.90 
The political changes initiated by Michail Gorbachev made a resolu-
tion of the conflict possible; the UN offered its good offices resulting in 
a series of agreements concluded between Afghanistan (i.e. the Com-
munist Najibullah government), Pakistan, the USSR and the United 
States in Geneva, which provided the legal basis for the withdrawal of 
foreign troops.91 The Secretary-General thus established, with the au-
thorization of the Security Council,92 the United Nations Good Offices 
Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)93 consisting of a 
military section under the Finnish General Rauli Helminen,94 and a po-
                                                           
87 The newly appointed Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan 
delivered his first annual report in 1985. The Austrian jurist Felix Ermacora 
was Special Rapporteur from 1984 to 1995. 
88 A/RES/40/137 of 13 December 1985 entitled “Questions of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan”. 
89 UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, and WFP.  
90 Responsibility for the Operation passed in 1991 to Benon Sevan the Per-
sonal Representative of the Secretary-General. 
91 Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, 
concluded at Geneva on 14 April 1988 under UN auspices, commonly re-
ferred to as the “Geneva Agreements”. The format that was agreed upon 
by the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Diego Córdovez 
with Kabul and Islamabad during talks in April and May 1985 was a series 
of bilateral agreements on non-interference and non-intervention, a decla-
ration on international guarantees by the USSR and the US, a bilateral 
agreement on the voluntary return of refugees, an agreement between the 
USSR and Afghanistan on the withdrawal of troops, and an instrument that 
would set out the relationship between these bilateral agreements. For a 
contemporary discussion see R. Klass, “Afghanistan: The Accords”, For-
eign Aff. 66 (1988), 25 et seq. 
92 S/RES/622 (1988) of 31 October 1988. 
93 The diplomatic history, the legal basis and the mandate for UNGOMAP is 
well presented in United Nations, Repertory of Practice of United Nations 
Organs, Supplement No. 7, 1989, article 98, paras 364-372. 
94 Further information can be found on the website of the Finnish Defence 
Forces (in Finnish): <www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/historia/ex_ungomap_ 
osgap.dsp>. 
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litical section under Benon Sevan. The mission was mandated to oversee 
the withdrawal of foreign troops and authorized to receive complaints 
from both sides about alleged improper implementation of the Agree-
ments.  
With the lapse of UNGOMAP’s mandate, one year after the Soviet 
withdrawal, the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (OSGAP)95 was established on 15 March 1990, which mir-
rored the dual set-up of a military and a political component. The latter 
was headed by Benon Sevan as the Personal Representative of the Sec-
retary-General. OSGAP drafted a transition plan once the United 
States and the Soviet Union suspended military aid to their respective 
factions and declared their support for a UN-sponsored transfer of 
power to an interim government. The transition plan elaborated by 
Sevan, however, “broke down with the disintegration of the state that 
the interim government was supposed to rule.”96 As fighting intensified 
in 1992 the mujahideen closed in on Kabul and brought down the Na-
jibullah government.97  
The end of the Communist government also meant the end of the 
unifying force of a common enemy that had hitherto unified the diverse 
and factitious mujahideen alliance, which was unable to agree on a suc-
cessor government and quickly turned against each other, heavily sup-
ported by external powers that pursued regional interests through 
proxies. There had been an agreement signed in Peshawar on 24 April 
1992 by all mujahideen forces98 – with the notable exception of Gul-
buddin Hekmatyar – to form a government under Sigbatullah Mo-
jaddedi as head of a Transitional Council for two months that would 
                                                           
95 Report of the Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Im-
plications for International Peace and Security, Doc. A/45/635-S/21879 of 
17 October 1990, para. 21. 
96 Rubin, see note 24, 269. For an overview of various prior UN initiatives see 
M.K. Ma’aroof, United Nations and Afghanistan Crisis, 1990. 
97 Najibullah sought refuge in the UN compound where he remained until 
1996. Despite repeated pleas by the Secretary-General he was not assured 
safe passage. After the Taliban took control of Kabul, they abducted Na-
jibullah and his brother on 26 September 1996 and subsequently executed 
them. The action was strongly condemned by the General-Assembly in 
Resolution 51/108, para. 10 of 12 December 1996, and the Security Council 
Statement Doc. S/PRST/1996/40. 
98 For a discussion of the legal and constitutional implications of the Pesha-
war Accord see Bachardoust, see note 53, 235 et seq. 
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then be replaced by a Leadership Council under Burhannudin Rabbani 
for four months.  
In July 1992 the Islamic State of Afghanistan was proclaimed as the 
successor to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, with Rabbani as 
its president. The General Assembly welcomed the establishment of the 
state, seeing it as “provid[ing] a new opportunity for the reconstruction 
of the country,”99 underlined “the importance of the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of Afghanistan”,100 whose development had suffered 
during the previous fourteen years of war, and “affirmed the urgent 
need to initiate international action to assist Afghanistan in restoring 
basic services and in rebuilding the country”.101 
According to the Peshawar Accord Rabbani was supposed to relin-
quish power in October, but he refused to do so. Hekmatyar who had 
stayed outside the Accord had never accepted the legitimacy of the new 
government, and by that time heavy fighting had erupted between his 
forces and those loyal to the government, commanded by Ahmad Shah 
Massoud, the minister of defense of the Islamic State. Throughout the 
Soviet occupation the larger cities, and especially Kabul, had remained 
under firm control of the government and had thus been spared from 
destruction. The fighting that broke out between the various muja-
hideen factions, on the contrary, centered on the control over the cities, 
resulting in heavy damage, especially in Kabul.  
In the subsequent fighting the Peshawar Accord unraveled, and the 
mujahideen factions turned against each other in a bewildering succes-
sion of alliances, counter-alliances, betrayals, and severe atrocities 
committed by all against all. There were two peace accords102 signed in 
1993, on 7 March in Islamabad and on 18 May in Jalalabad, between 
Rabbani and eight other faction leaders (though, again, not with Hek-
matyar) which established an interim government for eighteen months, 
in which period the drafting of a new constitution through a constitu-
ent assembly and the preparation of an electoral process was to take 
place. Unfortunately these attempts were not successful. 
                                                           
99 A/RES/47/119 of 18 December 1992, preambular para. 1. 
100 Ibid., preambular para. 5. 
101 Ibid., preambular para. 7. 
102 The so called Islamabad Accords were signed with the support of Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. The UN was not involved in the process. For de-
tails, see Rubin, note 24, 271-274. 
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Under the influence of the continued heavy fighting the General As-
sembly requested the Secretary-General in December 1993 to establish 
the United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA)103 with a 
more active mandate of “facilitating national rapprochement and recon-
struction,” beyond merely monitoring events and reporting them.104 
The former minister of foreign affairs of Tunisia, Mahmoud Mestiri, 
was thus appointed on 12 February 1994 as Special Envoy of the Secre-
tary-General and headed UNSMA. He was succeeded in May 1996 by 
Dr. Norbert Holl, who resigned effectively on 29 December 1997. His 
deputy James Ngobi took over as acting head until the appointment of 
Lakhdar Brahimi in July 1998. 
Given the unwillingness of the local factions to come to an agree-
ment, and given further the proxy nature of much of the fighting with 
regional powers each pursuing their own political and ideological ends 
through their economic and military support of competing mujahideen 
groups, it should come as no surprise that UNSMA remained largely 
ineffective. From its inception in 1994 until the appointment of Brahimi 
“UNSMA is widely regarded as making little headway, a situation that 
was not helped by ineffectual earlier SRSG [Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General] appointments”.105 One of the key changes insti-
gated by Brahimi was to recognize formally that the Afghan conflict 
was aggravated due to foreign interference,106 leading to the creation of 
the so-called Six-plus-Two Group107 comprised of the neighboring 
                                                           
103 A/RES/48/208 of 21 December 1993, para. 4. 
104 “Invited the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the overall situation 
in Afghanistan and make available his good offices as required, and to report 
to the General Assembly”, para. 5, emphasis added. 
105 M. Duffield, et al., Review of the Strategic Framework, AREU, 2001, 31; 
likewise: B.R. Rubin, et al., Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Peacebuilding 
in a Regional Framework, Centre for Peacebuilding, Swiss Peace Founda-
tion, 2001; M. Fielden/ J. Goodhand, Peace-Making in the New World Dis-
order: A Study of the Afghan Conflict and Attempts to Resolve it, IDPM 
Manchester/INTRAC Oxford, 2001,  
106 “Deploring the fact that despite repeated pleas by the Security Council, the 
General Assembly and the Secretary-General to halt foreign interference in 
Afghanistan, including the involvement of foreign military personnel and 
the supply of arms and ammunition to all parties in the conflict, such inter-
ference continues unabated”, S/RES/1193 (1998) of 28 August 1998, pre-
ambular para. 7. 
107 “Calls upon all States neighbouring Afghanistan and other States with in-
fluence in the country to intensify their efforts under the aegis of the 
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countries (Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
China) plus Russia and the United States. 
The explicit mandate of UNSMA and of the SRSG has been 
throughout to bring all Afghan factions together to negotiate a settle-
ment. However, as the language of the respective Security Council reso-
lutions indicates, it became increasingly clear that the Taliban were not 
willing to negotiate in good faith,108 and that active military support by 
regional powers, especially Pakistan, continued unabated, despite re-
peated Security Council resolutions to the contrary.109 
Furthermore, at least after the bombings of the US embassies in 
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in 1998, the possible involvement of al 
Qaeda became more apparent.110 The Security Council condemned the 
                                                           
United Nations to bring the parties to a negotiated settlement;” ibid., para. 
4. 
108 “Deploring the fact that despite the readiness of the United Front of Af-
ghanistan [the Northern Alliance] to conclude a durable ceasefire and to 
enter into a political dialogue with the Taliban, fighting continues on both 
sides, […]”, S/RES/1214 (1998) of 8 December 1998 preambular para. 3; 
“Reiterates its very strong support and appreciation for the continuing ef-
forts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to secure the full im-
plementation of its resolutions and demands that all parties, in particular 
the Taliban, cooperate in good faith with these efforts;” ibid., The Taliban 
failed to respond either to the requests to take actions against preparatory 
activities by terrorists (S/RES/1214 (1998) of 8 December 1998; 
S/RES/1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999; S/RES/1333 (2000) of 19 Decem-
ber 2000; S/RES/1378 (2001) of 14 November 2001), or to the requests to 
turn over Osama bin Laden (S/RES/1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999; 
S/RES/1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000). 
109 S/RES/1214 (1998) of 8 December 1998, para. 10; S/RES/1193 (1998) of 28 
August 1998, preambular para. 7, para. 3; S/RES/1076 of 22 October 1996, 
paras. 3, 4. 
110 It is interesting to note that on 20 August 1998 US President Bill Clinton 
ordered “Operation Infinite Reach”, i.e. retaliatory cruise missile strikes 
against alleged terrorist bases in Afghanistan, as well as a pharmaceutical 
plant in Sudan alleged to have been involved in the manufacture of chemi-
cal weapons. The latter allegations could not be substantiated by later on-
site investigations. Usama bin Laden and Muhammad Atef were indicted 
for their involvement in the embassy bombings on 4 November 1998 in 
Manhattan Federal Court. The indictment included the alleged claim that 
there had been cooperation between al-Qaeda and the government of Iraq. 
See <http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/Bin_Laden_Atef_Indicted_ 
in_U.S._Federal_Court_for_African_Bombings.html>. 
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attacks and called upon Member States to fully cooperate with Kenyan, 
Tanzanian and US authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice with-
out, however, explicitly mentioning Afghanistan or the Taliban.111 With 
mounting evidence of al Qaeda involvement, the Security Council 
adopted a tougher stance and imposed sanctions on the Taliban gov-
ernment for “continu[ing] to provide safe haven to Usama bin Laden 
and to allow him and others associated with him to operate a network 
of terrorist training camps from Taliban-controlled territory and to use 
Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international terrorist op-
eration”.112 
In many respects this constituted the crossing of the Rubicon for the 
efforts of the UN in Afghanistan, because it had become apparent now 
that the efforts of coming to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban 
had not only remained ineffective, as already indicated in Resolution 
1214 (1998), but that furthermore the international community had fi-
nally identified the Taliban as part of the problem, and no longer a pos-
sible component of the solution. 
Coinciding with this tougher line taken by the Security Council,113 
the Secretary-General and his Special Representative agreed that under 
the given circumstances and given the lack of progress towards a nego-
tiated settlement his further involvement would serve little purpose.114 
Although not stated explicitly, this decision was partly motivated by the 
continued strong military interference of the neighboring countries, es-
pecially Pakistan’s supply of military advisors, arms, and manpower to 
the Taliban which made them more intransigent than ever.115 Despite 
                                                           
111 S/RES/1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, para. 3. 
112 S/RES/1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999. 
113 S/RES/1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000 which reiterated the demand to 
cooperate with the political process led by the SRSG, to hand over bin 
Laden, and in a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to 
withhold military support and to scale back diplomatic contacts. The tone 
was further sharpened through S/RES/1363 (2001) of 30 July 2001 which 
established the so-called Monitoring Group and the Sanctions Enforcement 
Support Team to implement the sanctions imposed through S/RES/1267 
(1999) of 15 October 1999 and S/RES/1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000. 
114 “[M]y Special Envoy and I have reached the conclusion that given the lack 
of progress achieved so far, his activities should be “frozen” until such time 
as circumstances change to justify his renewed intervention.” Annual Re-
port of the Secretary-General on Afghanistan, Doc. A/54/536-S/1999/1145, 
Sec. VIII of 16 November 1999. 
115 Duffield, et al., see note 105, 31. 
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Brahimi’s resignation, the mandate of UNSMA was upgraded. While it 
had, since its inception, been formulated in the following relatively gen-
eral terms, namely “to mediate an end to the conflict and to facilitate 
the implementation of a comprehensive peaceful settlement”116, the Sec-
retary-General now stated that it was to “assume the primary role in 
conducting United Nations peacemaking activities in Afghanistan. It is 
my intention to appoint a substantive Head of the Mission at the Assis-
tant Secretary-General level”.117 
The General Assembly endorsed these recommendations of upgrad-
ing UNSMA and to progressively move the mission from Islamabad to 
Kabul and to increase its presence in the neighboring countries.118 
Francesc Vendrell was appointed on 12 January 2000 as the new Per-
sonal Representative and Head of UNSMA,119 while Brahimi served as 
Under-Secretary for Special Assignments, chairing the independent 
panel convened by Secretary-General Annan on 7 March 2000 to re-
view the UN preventive and peacemaking efforts. This panel delivered 
its report on 17 August 2000,120 and much of the approach taken by 
UNAMA later on draws on the lessons suggested in this report, in par-
ticular the attempt to coordinate all UN efforts, i.e. both military 
peacekeeping, civilian police aspects, political affairs, humanitarian as-
sistance, as well as physical and institutional reconstruction provided 
by many different UN agencies and organs into a coherent and inte-
grated structure. 
2. Consequences of the “Brahimi Report” 
One of the findings of the Brahimi report that was subsequently im-
plemented in the approach taken by the UN with regard to Afghanistan 
after September 11, was the special emphasis on a robust peace-keeping 
force able to defend itself and its mandate. Previously the UN had often 
sent blue helmets into situations where “the parties to the conflict were 
not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations 
                                                           
116 A/RES/51/195 of 17 December 1996. 
117 Doc. A/54/536-S/1999/1145, Sec. VIII, emphasis added. 
118 A/RES/54/189 A of 17 December 1999. 
119 Doc. A/54/706-S/2000/20 of 14 January 2000. 
120 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809, commonly referred to as “Brahimi Report”, <www.un.org/ 
peace/reports/peace_operations/>. 
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operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to 
create them.”121 The conceptual distinction thus had to be made be-
tween peace-keepers and peace builders; where there was no peace to be 
kept, a robust force with a strong mandate was required to enforce it. 
The report furthermore accepted that it was unlikely that such 
troops would be forthcoming under UN auspices. The politicized na-
ture of UN troop deployment made even minor tactical decisions unac-
ceptably slow. Classical UN peace-keeping so far had relied on the 
troop contributions of a relatively small number of countries. Peace-
enforcement, however, required larger military capabilities that these 
nations were not able to muster. The report advocated the concept of 
“subcontracting” peace-enforcement to interested national or regional 
contingents, which would remain under national command without be-
ing subordinate to a Commander-in-Chief appointed by the Secretary- 
General. In his report to the Security Council on 13 November 2001 
Brahimi laid out his strategic vision for the UN’s role in Afghanistan 
and remarked on the issue of security provision: 
“An armed UN peacekeeping force is not recommended. The Secre-
tary-General would require several months to obtain from Member 
States sufficient numbers of troops to pose a credible military deter-
rent, and to subsequently deploy them. Furthermore, UN peace-
keepers have proven successful when deployed to implement an ex-
isting political settlement among willing parties – not to serve as a 
substitute for one”.122 
The other noteworthy aspect that found its way from the report 
into implementation in Afghanistan was the close operational and stra-
tegic coordination through an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) at 
headquarters and through pooling available funds and various donor 
activities on the ground through one channel (trust funds and 
UNAMA) that could provide the necessary strategic vision and coordi-
nation. 
                                                           
121 Ibid., Executive Summary. 
122 Brahimi, see note 41.  
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3. Present UN involvement and the Bonn Agreement 
a. Events Leading to Bonn 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 had changed the situation on the 
ground dramatically. The attacks were condemned by both the General 
Assembly123 and the Security Council,124 and the involvement of al 
Qaeda quickly became apparent.125 US President Bush thus delivered 
on 20 September 2001 an ultimatum to the Taliban regime to hand over 
the al Qaeda leaders, and verifiably close down the alleged terrorist 
camps.126 Few believed that, given their ideological stance as well as 
their dependency on al Qaeda for financial, logistic, and military sup-
port, the Taliban were in a position to accept the terms offered. 
On 6 October 2001 President Bush informed Congress that the de-
mands had not been met and that military action would commence the 
next day. The military campaign was supported by a number of coun-
tries and essentially used the Northern Alliance as the ground forces of 
the Coalition.127 It was apparent that once the military campaign had 
                                                           
123 A/RES/56/1 of 12 September 2001. 
124 S/RES/1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001. 
125 The short and curt statement made on 19 September 2001 by the President 
of the Security Council, Jean-David Levitte (France) is highly indicative in 
this regard: “Today there is one, and only one, message the Security Coun-
cil has for the Taliban: implement United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions, in particular resolution 1333, immediately and unconditionally.” 
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126 Address to a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001,  
 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>. 
127 On the question of its legality only exemplary: R. Wolfrum, “The Attack 
of September 11, 2001, the Wars Against the Taliban and Iraq: Is There a 
Need to Reconsider International Law on the Recourse to Force and the 
Rules in Armed Conflict?” Max Planck UNYB 7 (2003), 1 et seq.; M. 
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T. Franck, “Terrorism and the Right to Self Defense”, AJIL 95 (2001), 840 
et seq.; C. Tomuschat, “Der 11. September 2001 und seine rechtlichen Fol-
gen”, EuGRZ 28 (2001), 535 et seq.; E.P.J. Myjer / N.D. White, “The Twin 
Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?”, Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 7 (2002), 5 et seq.; T. Bruha, “Gewaltverbot und humani-
täres Völkerrecht nach dem 11. September 2001”, Archiv des Völkerrechts 
40 (2002), 383 et seq.; S.D. Murphy, “Terrorism and the Concept of 
“Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter”, Harv. Int’l L. J. 43 
(2002), 41 et seq.; D. Abramowitz, “The President, the Congress, and the 
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succeeded, a political solution had to be found whose legitimacy went 
beyond what the United States could muster on its own. In anticipation 
of the military campaign, whose success was never seriously ques-
tioned, the Secretary-General re-appointed Brahimi as his Special Rep-
resentative on 3 October 2001 and entrusted him with the overall re-
sponsibility for the humanitarian, human rights, and political endeavors 
of the UN in Afghanistan; the former head of UNSMA, Francesc Ven-
drell became his deputy. 
On his appointment Brahimi immediately contacted the members of 
the Six-plus-Two Group, especially Iran and Pakistan, and canvassed 
their support for the settlement process towards the creation of a 
broad-based, multi-ethnic Afghan government, and the central role of 
the UN in this process.128 In his presentation of this approach to the Se-
curity Council the following day, he built upon his consultations with 
the Six-plus-Two and outlined in essence the roadmap followed in 
Bonn.129 One thing that became apparent during these consultations as 
well as during his presentation to the Security Council was the urgent 
need for speed in order to remain on top of the rapidly changing mili-
tary situation. As the Northern Alliance rapidly expanded its control 
and entered Kabul on the very day of his presentation, it became urgent 
to avoid a fait accompli on the ground and to use the unprecedented 
window of opportunity offered by the consensus between all major 
backers of the four main Afghan groups. The key points outlined by 
Brahimi that were to guide the negotiations in Bonn were: 
- only a legitimate Afghan government representing all the people 
could gather sufficient resolve and legitimacy to confront the hold 
international terrorist groups had over the country; 
- the recognition of the special role, and the legitimate interests of 
Iran and Pakistan, as well as the ties that exist between them and 
certain Afghan groups; 
                                                           
Use of Force: Legal and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of 
Force Against Terrorism”, Harv. Int’l L. J. 43 (2002), 71 et seq.; M. Kra-
jewski, “Selbstverteidigung gegen bewaffnete Angriffe nicht-staatlicher 
Organisationen – Der 11. September 2001 und seine Folgen”, AVR 40 
(2002), 183 et seq. 
128 Declaration on the Situation in Afghanistan by the Foreign Ministers and 
other senior representatives of the “Six plus Two” on 12 November 2001, 
<www.un.org.pk/latest-dev/hq-press-011112.htm>. 
129 Brahimi, see note 41. 
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- the commitment by all parties involved, especially these two coun-
tries, towards a political solution that would preserve the unity and 
territorial integrity of Afghanistan; 
- consensus between the neighbors, only without undue interference 
would the Afghans be able to arrive at a durable solution; 
- the recognition that a stable Afghanistan is in the regional interest, 
in particular in the national interest of Iran and Pakistan, especially 
concerning drug production; 
- the need for a broad-based, multi-ethnic, politically balanced, 
freely chosen government enjoying both domestic and international 
legitimacy; 
- pivotal role of the UN in convening the negotiations and mediat-
ing between the parties, as well as in the implementation; 
- undesirability to impose an external solution on the Afghans; 
- need for the sustained long-term engagement of the international 
community in providing the necessary resources, politically and fi-
nancially; 
- given the rapidly changing military realities, a continuation of the 
shuttle diplomacy was unfeasible, and the four main groups (North-
ern Alliance, Rome Group (around the former King), Cyprus 
Group (Iranian diaspora), and Peshawar Group (Pakistani diaspora) 
should convene as soon as humanly possible at a convenient venue; 
- these existing groups and processes would commence the negotia-
tions, and would later be supplemented by additional representa-
tives to ensure broad participation, but the initial lack of representa-
tiveness should not detract from the ability to agree on a framework; 
- to create the institutions of good governance, the aim was to for-
mulate clear and fair rules of the game and adherence to those rules, 
to be sustainable, Afghans themselves needed to be engaged in their 
creation, with particular recourse to be had to returning diaspora 
Afghans; this being preferable and more legitimate than a transi-
tional administration run by the UN130 or another constellation of 
foreigners; 
                                                           
130 For an insightful, succinct, and sympathetic account of UN administrations 
in East Timor, post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, and 
Kosovo, see R. Caplan, A New Trusteeship? The International Administra-
tion of War-torn Territories, 2002. 
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- the deployment of a robust security force, in particular for Kabul, 
with preference to a multinational, non-UN force; 
- Kabul was to be demilitarized and should not be controlled by any 
one faction; 
- closely integrated UN mission implementation, with clear lines of 
authority and responsibility among the donors and within the UN 
system; 
- all actors were to accept the principle that Afghans are in charge 
and must have ownership of the process; 
- the institutions to be agreed upon were to be provisional and 
would, of necessity, not include every one who should have been 
considered, as well as including some whose credentials were ques-
tionable; in the interest of peace and considering that this was but 
the beginning of a process not the end point of a settlement, these 
shortcomings were to be accepted.131 
The Taliban withdrew from Kabul on the day Brahimi presented his 
approach to the Security Council. Thus, Deputy SRSG Vendrell was 
dispatched immediately to Kabul, and the next day, on 14 November 
2001, the Security Council endorsed the approach suggested by Bra-
himi in resolution 1378,132 expressing their “strong support for the ef-
forts of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional admini-
stration leading to the formation of a government, both of which: 
- should be broad based, multi-ethnic and fully representative of all 
the Afghan people and committed to peace with Afghanistan’s 
neighbors, 
- should respect the human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of 
gender, ethnicity or religion, 
- should respect Afghanistan’s international obligations, including 
by cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism and 
illicit drug trafficking within and from Afghanistan, and 
- should facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and 
the orderly return of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
when the situation permits”;133 
Furthermore, the Member States were called upon to support such a 
new government and administration, to provide the necessary emer-
                                                           
131 Brahimi, see note 41. 
132 S/RES/1378 (2001) of 14 November 2001. 
133 Ibid., para. 1. 
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gency relief and long-term assistance for the reconstruction process, 
and to support efforts to ensure the safety and security of areas of Af-
ghanistan no longer under Taliban control.134 
b. The Negotiations in Bonn 
What is remarkable, particularly in light of the decades of failed at-
tempts at international mediation, is the extremely fast pace at which 
the above outline was put into action. Germany offered to host the 
talks, which were convened less than two weeks later, on 27 November 
in a hotel close to Bonn. The talks were conducted under extreme time 
pressure, partly in order to keep pace with the fact-changing situation 
on the ground, and partly for quite mundane logistical reasons.135 The 
delegates represented the following main groups:136 the United Front 
for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alli-
ance,137 a Tajik-dominated military alliance of most of the remaining 
non-Taliban armed formations whose main geographic stronghold had 
been the Panshir valley and whose troops had already occupied Kabul 
(and the major ministries) by the time the negotiations began in Bonn. 
The other groups were the so-called Cyprus group as a representation 
of the Dari-speaking diaspora including representatives of the Shia 
Hazara minority,138 residing mainly in Iran; the Peshawar group repre-
senting the Pashtu-speaking diaspora, residing mainly in Pakistan; and 
the Rome group around the former king, thus representing moderate, 
mostly Pashtun Afghans throughout the Western diaspora.139 
The groups assembled in Bonn were united by little more than their 
opposition to the Taliban, who were themselves conspicuous by their 
                                                           
134 Ibid., paras 4 and 5. 
135 The hotel was booked for a dentist convention after 5 December, leading to 
many of the key decisions, such as the selection of the ministers of the in-
terim administration, being negotiated in the final night. See Rubin, see 
note 36, 570. 
136 For a succinct description of the different groups see Rubin, see note 34. 
137 The Northern Alliance was led in Bonn by Yunus Qanooni, and reported 
to Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was formally still the president of the Is-
lamic State of Afghanistan. 
138 The Cyprus group was led by Homayun Jareer, the son-in-law of Gulbud-
din Hekmatyar, whose opposition had brought the first post-Communist 
government to fall. 
139 A provisional list can be found at <www.un.org.pk/latest-dev/hq-press-
list-cont-afg-provlist.htm>.  
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absence. The fact that the latter were not present, and that there was 
only one other group with a military presence on the ground, probably 
made an agreement possible in the first place. Nevertheless, as has al-
ready been mentioned, this constellation perhaps also explains why the 
agreement did not mention any procedure to account for past atrocities. 
Transitional justice relies on the common acceptance by all sides to a 
domestic conflict that there is some legitimacy to all claims, albeit pur-
sued through questionable means. Given the political and military reali-
ties leading up to the Bonn process, it should come as no surprise that 
this necessary dynamic was missing at this junction in Afghanistan.140  
Apart from the issue of accountability for the past, several other is-
sues were highly contentious during the negotiations, inter alia the 
question of the demobilization of the mujahideen forces, the establish-
ment of an international security assistance force for Kabul, the role of 
the former king, as well as the lack of any perceived role for the nomi-
nal president Rabbani.141 There were strong divisions between Rabbani 
and the three moderate Tajik leaders within the Northern Alliance: the 
designated interior minister Yunus Qanooni,142 minister of defense 
General Mohammad Fahim, and minister of foreign affairs Abdullah 
Abdullah. Only concerted interventions by the major Northern Alli-
ance commanders on the ground, Ismail Khan, Abdul Rashid Dustum 
and the Shiite Hazara leader Karim Khalili, the threat by Qanooni to 
openly defy him, as well as the personal intervention of the German 
minister of foreign affairs Fischer and SRSG Brahimi, convinced him to 
acquiesce. 
The explicit message conveyed to him by the US special envoy and 
later US ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad that the US would hold ac-
                                                           
140 President Karzai went on record to say that peace is a necessity and  
justice a luxury that Afghanistan cannot afford right now. See interview of 
10 May 2002 with Lyse Doucet at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_ 
point/1940038.stm>. 
141 See Rubin, see note 36, 572; for a good contemporary overview of the rele-
vant actors and their motivations see also P. Bora, “Interim Afghan Gov-
ernment: First Step to Stability”, <www.subcontinent.com/sapra/regional/ 
regional20011206a.html>. 
142 Due to a miscalculation of his, Qanooni later refused the post of interior 
minister planning to become prime minister under a system similar to the 
French presidential system. Once it became apparent that the presidential 
system adopted would resemble the American one without the post of a 
prime minister, Qanooni had to backtrack and settle for the relatively un-
important post of minister of education. 
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countable anyone who opposed the peace process, might very well have 
proved decisive in this respect. The opposition expressed by Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar (a Pashtun) who had been sidelined during the negotiations 
and who had denounced its conclusions as American-imposed and thus 
illegitimate remained largely ineffective, not least due to the same threat 
of decisive US action likely to be taken against him. Reflecting the 
situation on the ground, ethnic Tajiks were strongly represented during 
the negotiations, and in the interim administration that it previewed. 
The Pashtun majority was represented by the moderate exiles in the 
Rome group, as well as through the Peshawar group. The choice of the 
Kandahari Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai as the head of the in-
terim administration was intended to counter-balance the dominance of 
the Tajiks. Karzai had been deputy minister of foreign affairs in the first 
mujahideen government of 1992 under Rabbani, later becoming minis-
ter of foreign affairs. His family had had strong links to both Pakistan 
and the US, and being fluent in English as well as Urdu, yet from an old 
aristocratic family with close links to the king, he was seen as an ideal 
man able to appeal to very divergent constituencies, both domestic and 
international.143 The assumption that an ethnic Pashtun head of the in-
terim administration was required to integrate the Pashtun majority 
into the peace process and wean them away from their allegiance to the 
Taliban has proved correct. Despite the initial loud denouncement of 
his choice by radical Pashtun leaders such as Hekmatyar, Haji Abdul 
Qadeer,144 Mehmood Khan Achakzai,145 or Gul Agha Sherzai,146 Karzai 
has subsequently proved able to integrate the Pashtun constituency 
through his personality, family ties, and skilled political maneuvering.  
                                                           
143 It is interesting to note in this respect that the former king Zaher Shah ini-
tially opposed Karzai’s nomination, favoring instead the ethnic Uzbek Ab-
dul Sattar Seerat, a former minister of justice under the king. 
144 Governor of the eastern Pashtun province of Nangahar, who walked out of 
the Bonn negotiations on 1 December complaining about the alleged lack 
of representation of the Pashtun community. 
145 Head of the Pakistan-based Pashunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), the 
Pashtun nationalist party. 
146 Former governor of Kandahar, whose troops were besieging the Taliban 
forces in the city at the time of the Bonn negotiations. While he initially 
objected to the insufficient representation of the Pashtuns he later collabo-
rated with the Karzai government and received the post of governor. He 
was dismissed and assumed a post in Kabul in August 2003. 
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The negotiations in Bonn resulted in the signing of the Bonn 
Agreement147 on 5 December 2001. This Agreement previewed the offi-
cial transfer of power to an Interim Authority on the 22 December of 
that year148 and laid down a very ambitious time frame for the further 
establishment of state institutions. The participants in Bonn were rea-
sonably representative of the ethnic and political diversity of the coun-
try, but while certainly acceptable as a provisional measure, it was clear 
that it could not confer lasting democratic legitimacy. Therefore, it was 
agreed that an Interim Authority149 would be nominated in Bonn with 
a mandate for six months,150 during which time an Emergency Loya 
Jirga would be convened whose broader representation would allow a 
more legitimate basis for the Transitional Government that it would 
name.151 The latter would have a mandate for two years152 during which 
it would re-establish government structures, name a Constitutional 
Commission to prepare a draft constitution and organize the elections 
for a Constitutional Loya Jirga to be convened no later than 18 months 
after the establishment of the Transitional Authority in order to adopt 
the new constitution.153 Furthermore, the legal framework to be appli-
cable until the adoption of a new constitution was agreed upon.154 
                                                           
147 “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions”, see note 30. 
148 Section I (1) Bonn Agreement. 
149 Consisting of an Interim Administration (i.e. Cabinet) presided over by a 
Chairman (Karzai), a Special Independent Commission for the Convention 
of the Emergency Loya Jirga, and a Supreme Court as well as lower courts. 
Section I (2) Bonn Agreement.  
150 “Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward 
the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully 
representative government, and are not intended to remain in place beyond 
the specific period of time,” preambular para. 7 Bonn Agreement; Section I 
(4) Bonn Agreement. 
151 Section I (4), (5) Bonn Agreement. 
152 Section I (4) Bonn Agreement. 
153 Section I (6) Bonn Agreement. 
154 Section II (1) Bonn Agreement: “i) The Constitution of 1964, a/ to the ex-
tent that its provisions are not inconsistent with those contained in this 
agreement, and b/ with the exception of those provisions relating to the 
monarchy and to the executive and legislative bodies provided in the Con-
stitution; and ii) existing laws and regulations, to the extent that they are 
not inconsistent with this agreement or with international legal obligations 
to which Afghanistan is a party, or with those applicable provisions con-
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In view of the fact that the security situation in Afghanistan was 
dismal after the fall of the Taliban, and security can still not be guaran-
teed155 by the Afghans themselves as there are not sufficient military 
and police forces loyal to the central authorities, the Bonn Agreement 
included the request for the deployment of a UN mandated force. In 
the spirit of the Bonn Agreement, the request for assistance in the main-
tenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas goes hand in 
hand with the recognition that “the responsibility for providing secu-
rity and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans 
themselves.”156 Pursuant to this request, the Security Council author-
ized the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority to maintain security in 
Kabul and the surrounding areas for a period of six months.157 This pe-
riod has been extended a number of times and after NATO158 took over 
command of ISAF,159 the international security assistance has been ex-
tended beyond Kabul.160 The UN involvement in Afghanistan thus 
consists of a civil mandate combined with a multi-national military 
force that is not under UN command. 
                                                           
tained in the Constitution of 1964, provided that the Interim Authority 
shall have the power to repeal or amend those laws and regulations.” 
155 Only exemplary: “Die Armut bleibt, der Terror schwillt an” Frankfurter 
Rundschau of 2 June 2005; HRW, Afghanistan: Violence Surges of 23 May 
2005, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/HRW/7c0146cf8972 
bdfa0855036f1313505b.htm>. 
156 Annex I (1) Bonn Agreement. 
157 See S/RES/1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001. For the mandate see 
S/RES/1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001, S/RES/1413 (2002) of 23 May 
2002, S/RES/1444 (2002) of 27 November 2002, S/RES/1510 (2003) of 13 
October 2003, S/RES/1563 (2004) of 17 September 2004, for twelve 
months. 
158 Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its im-
plications for international peace and security, Doc. A/57/850-S/2003/754 
of 23 July 2003, para. 37. 
159 The nations leading ISAF before NATO took over the command were: 
United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands. See Reports of 
the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for 
international peace and security, Doc. A/56/875-S/2002/278 of 18 March 
2002, para. 55; Doc. A/56/1000-S/2002/737 of 11 July 2002, para. 26; Doc. 
A/57/762-S/2003/333 of 18 March 2003, para. 36. 
160 Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its im-
plications for international peace and security, Doc. A/59/581-S/2004/925 
of 26 November 2004, para. 37. See also note 2. 
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The Bonn Agreement establishes the character of the UN involve-
ment in Afghanistan as merely supportive, with control lying in the 
hands of the Afghan authorities from the very beginning of the recon-
struction and peace-building process. The Preamble reaffirms “the in-
dependence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghani-
stan” while “[a]cknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to 
freely determine their own political future in accordance with the prin-
ciples of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice”, and finally de-
termines that the UN, “as the internationally recognized impartial insti-
tution, has a particularly important role to play, …, in the period prior 
to the establishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan”, thereby 
already placing limits on the UN involvement. 
It establishes that power shall be transferred to the Interim Author-
ity only weeks after the talks in Bonn,161 confirming that “the Interim 
Authority shall be the repository of Afghan sovereignty, with immedi-
ate effect.”162 As stated in the preamble of the Bonn Agreement, power 
was thus transferred directly from the Council of Ministers headed by 
Rabbani163 to the Interim Authority. Legally, genuine authority con-
tinuously rested with the Afghan authorities, instead of resting with the 
Secretary-General of the UN and being exercised through his Special 
Representative.164 In accordance with the merely supportive and con-
sultative role of the UN, the Bonn Agreement does not contain any re-
served powers, even in the event of the Interim Authority not being 
able to decide on matters relating to the convening of the Emergency 
Loya Jirga, which was essential for transferring power to a body of au-
thority legitimized by a more democratic process than the talks in 
Bonn. Had there been problems, the Special Representative of the Sec-
retary-General was merely to “use his/her good offices with a view to 
facilitating a resolution to the impasse or a decision.”165 In relation to 
human rights, apart from developing and implementing a program of 
human rights education, the UN only has “the right to investigate hu-
man rights violations and, where necessary, recommend corrective ac-
                                                           
161 Sovereignty was transferred to the Afghan Interim Authority on 22 De-
cember 2003. 
162 Section I (3) Bonn Agreement. 
163 See note 6. 
164 Two examples where the UN exercised authority are the reconstruction 
processes of Kosovo and East Timor, which are both described in this Vol-
ume by J. Friedrich and M. Benzing. 
165 See Annex II (5) Bonn Agreement. 
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tion.”166 In view of this limited role accorded to the United Nations in 
the Bonn Agreement and in view of the fact that Afghanistan has re-
mained a state with undisputed sovereignty throughout the long years 
of war, the UN has thus adopted a “light footprint” approach, focusing 
on building Afghan capacities and ensuring that UNAMA’s tasks are 
carried out in close coordination and consultation with Afghan authori-
ties.167 
c. UNAMA’s Mandate 
The “light footprint” approach mentioned above was decisive in deter-
mining the character of UNAMA, whose definition as an “assistance” 
mission already reinforces the intention of the UN to follow a non-
intrusive approach in Afghanistan. To deal with issues beyond ensuring 
security, the Security Council had endorsed the report by the Secretary-
General168 that called for the establishment of an UN Assistance Mis-
sion in Afghanistan (UNAMA) that was to help implement the Bonn 
Agreement169 and to assist in the relief, recovery and reconstruction of 
the country as foreseen in resolution 1401.170 The Report of the Secre-
tary-General of 18 March 2002171 provides the mandate and structure of 
the mission.172 The core of the mission’s mandate is defined as fol-
lows:173 
“(a) Fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities, including those related 
to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the 
                                                           
166 Annex II (6) Bonn Agreement. 
167 Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its im-
plications for international peace and security, Doc. A/56/875-S/2002/278 
of 18 March 2002 , para. 98. 
168 Doc. A/56/875-S/2002/278 of 18 March 2002. 
169 The UN’s role during the interim period had been determined by Annexes 
II and III to the Bonn Agreement, whose language is closely mirrored in 
the S/RES/1401 (2002) of 28 March 2002 and the report by the Secretary-
General Doc. A/56/875-S/2002/278 of 18 March 2002. 
170 S/RES/1401 (2002) of 28 March 2002, which defined its mandate for an ini-
tial period of twelve months, renewed since for subsequent twelve month 
periods in S/RES/1471 (2003) of 28 March 2003, S/RES/1536 (2004) of 26 
March 2004, S/RES/1589 (2005) of 24 March 2005. 
171 Doc. A/56/875-S/2002/278 of 18 March 2002. 
172 Ibid., paras 97 and 98. 
173 Ibid., para. 97. 
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United Nations in the Bonn Agreement, which were endorsed by 
the Security Council in its resolution 1383 (2001); 
(b) Promoting national reconciliation and rapprochement through-
out the country, through the good offices role of [the Secretary-
General’s] Special Representative; 
(c) Managing all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and 
reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, under the overall authority 
of [the Secretary-General’s] Special Representative and in coordina-
tion with the Interim Authority and successor administrations of 
Afghanistan.” 
As has already been pointed out, this mandate takes up many of the 
findings of the 2000 Brahimi report174 and can be seen as the first at-
tempt by the UN to establish a fully integrated mission under the au-
thority and leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Afghanistan.175 The mandate does not furnish UNAMA 
with any operational responsibility for administering any part of Af-
ghanistan, but is rather a recognition of the Afghan authorities’ ultimate 
responsibility for the Agreement’s implementation.176 UNAMA is to 
co-ordinate and consult closely with the Afghan actors to ensure that 
Afghan priorities lead the mission’s assistance efforts.177 The aim should 
be to increase Afghan capacity, while relying on as limited an interna-
tional presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible, and using 
common support services where possible, thereby leaving a light expa-
triate “footprint”.178 It is acknowledged that the fluidity of the situation 
might require a future revision and expansion of the mission’s man-
date.179 The emphasis on consultation and consent of the local authori-
ties that serves to create a feeling of “ownership” of the reconstruction 
process may be a model for future peace-keeping and reconstruction 
operations. It may prevent some of the problems that can arise at the 
end of an operation characterized by a more “controlling” approach, 
once the local authorities are left to fend for themselves. It seems logical 
that progress toward developing local democratic and administrative 
structures is more difficult to achieve when the means employed to-
                                                           
174 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809. 
175 Doc. A/56/875-S/2002/278 of 18 March 2002, para. 98 (a) and (e). 
176 Ibid., para. 98 (b). 
177 Ibid., para. 98 (c). 
178 Ibid, para. 98 (d). 
179 Ibid., para. 98 (i). 
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ward that end are authoritarian and imposed from the international 
community, not allowing local actors to be involved in the decision-
making process and not building local capacities.180 
To this end, UN agencies and the World Bank have embarked on 
capacity-building programs through the provision of training.181 In ad-
dition, program secretariats have been established within each ministry 
that are led by particular UN agencies and seconded with international 
staff.182 Within the government, the Afghan Assistance Coordination 
Authority (AACA) has been created to put in place a series of national 
programs that reflect Afghan priorities and that are oriented towards 
building the capacity of the Afghan Government, civil society and pri-
vate sector.183 The AACA is to work together with UNAMA, whose 
role is to coordinate the functions of all the UN agencies engaged in 
humanitarian assistance.  
Unfortunately, in practice the efforts have not been wholly satisfac-
tory. While the government in Kabul has drafted a National Develop-
ment Framework and has drawn up a National Development Budget in 
accordance with its responsibility for setting the planning and budget-
ary framework, it feels that it does not have the central role in deter-
mining policy and strategy.184 The UN sometimes appears to be operat-
ing like a parallel administration185 and while international aid for the 
national development budget is being tracked by the Ministry of Fi-
nance, the bulk of the external assistance to Afghanistan is still not be-
ing channeled through the national budget,186 as national sensibilities 
and the desire for “visibility” often trump the agreed need for inte-
grated coordination and local ownership. Furthermore, some critics 
have remarked that the mandate and self-image of the UN does not cor-
relate fully with the reality on the ground: 
                                                           
180 J.S. Kreilkamp, “U.N. Postconflict Reconstruction”, N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 35 (2002/2003), 619 et seq. (667). 
181 P. Marsden, “Afghanistan: the reconstruction process”, Int’l Aff. 79 (2003), 
91 and seq. (95). 
182 Ibid. 
183 Report of the Secretary-General of 18 March 2002, Doc. A/56/875-
S/2002/278, para. 15. 
184 Marsden, see note 181, 94, 95. 
185 Ibid., 95. 
186 Report of the Secretary-General, Doc. A/59/581-S/2004/925 of 26 No-
vember 2004, para. 47. 
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“Although Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Special Representative for Af-
ghanistan and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Afghanistan (UNAMA),187 promised a ‘light footprint’ in terms of 
international presence, based on lessons learned from East Timor, in 
practice there has been an extremely heavy footprint in Kabul and 
an extremely light (to the extent of being barely visible) footprint 
outside the capital”.188 
This has not only had a negative effect on the effectiveness of the in-
ternational effort, but has also created ill-feelings among the Afghan 
population excluded from the benefits associated with the international 
presence, particularly in the Pashtun South and South-East. Related 
negative effects are the dislocations and market distortions that inevita-
bly accompany the presence of a relatively large number of expatriate 
staff with commensurate needs and purchasing power. A distinct, but 
related criticism has been the extreme discrepancy in the salaries and 
remuneration packages earned by expatriate staff that only seldom 
translates into commensurate benefits for the local administration.189 
IV. Instruments of the Bonn Process 
1. Interim Authority and Emergency Loya Jirga 
One of the prerequisites for building a peaceful and stable state is the 
legitimacy of the government in charge of the peace-building processes. 
The Afghan authority that the international community first worked 
with was the Interim Authority under the chairmanship of Hamid Kar-
                                                           
187 SRSG Brahimi’s term ended on 31 December 2003, he was succeeded by 
Jean Arnault as SRSG, endorsed by S/RES/1536 of 26 March 2004. 
188 Goodhand, see note 26, 169. 
189 This is due in no small part to the inherent nature of providing external ex-
pertise to particular sections of the administration engaged in low-
specificity, high-transaction-volume activities. See F. Fukuyama, “Why 
there is no Science of Public Administration”, Journal of International Af-
fairs 58 (2004), 189 et seq. Whether the criticism leveled by Afghans such as 
Bachardoust and others, namely that the expertise supplied is sub-standard 
yet overpaid needs to be assessed in this light as well, throwing up ques-
tions about the wisdom of providing certain kind of expatriate expertise. 
Compare “Geldmaschine Afghanistan”, Der Spiegel of 26 March 2005, 116 
et seq. 
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zai,190 a body whose composition had been negotiated during the talks 
in Bonn.191 To remedy the problem that the members of the Interim 
Authority lacked a public mandate, the Bonn Agreement previewed the 
convention of an Emergency Loya Jirga within six months of the for-
mation of the Interim Authority to establish a Transitional Authority, 
including a broad-based transitional administration.192 
The Emergency Loya Jirga had three tasks: choose the head of state, 
determine the structure of the Transitional Authority and approve the 
key personnel that was to lead Afghanistan for a maximum of two years 
until elections could be carried out.193 Although the Bonn Agreement 
enjoys a measure of legitimacy and is broadly accepted as an agreement 
negotiated in good faith, the Afghan Interim Authority created by the 
Bonn Agreement was viewed to be less than representative.194 Many 
Afghans believed that the Emergency Loya Jirga, which convened in 
Kabul from 11-19 June 2002, would replace the Afghan Interim Au-
thority with a more broad-based successor administration. Unfortu-
                                                           
190 Reflecting the disagreement over the role of the king in the process, Section 
III (2) mentions that the chairmanship over the Interim Administration had 
been offered to the former king but that he had declined the offer. The 
honorific title “Father of the Nation” bestowed by the Emergency Loya 
Jirga on the former king largely served the same purpose of bridging the 
differences between those who had advocated a return to the monarchy, 
and those in favor of a republican set-up. Article 158 of the new Afghan 
Constitution confirms the grant of this title for the lifetime of former king 
Mohammad Zahir Shah. 
191 Section III Bonn Agreement. Its preliminary composition has been laid 
down in Annex IV to the Bonn Agreement. Its main features are a very 
large cabinet-style composition containing 30 members, including a 
Chairman, 5 Vice-Chairpersons who simultaneously preside over individ-
ual Departments, as well as 24 Heads of Department, corresponding to the 
envisaged structure of ministries. The large number of portfolios as well as 
vice-chairpersonships stems from the desire to include as many political 
and military actors as possible within the formal process, thus reducing the 
incentive for potential spoilers to disrupt the peace process by giving them 
a personal stake in it. Five departments were not filled in Bonn, thus allow-
ing for a certain flexibility to include others who were not present or repre-
sented during the negotiations. 
192 Section I (4) Bonn Agreement. 
193 Section I (4) and Section IV (5) Bonn Agreement. 
194 C. Johnson et al., Afghanistan’s political and constitutional development, 
Report of the Overseas Development Institute, January 2003, 12, 13, 
<www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/evaluations/afghandfid.pdf>. 
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nately, both the process – which was not transparent – and its result fell 
short of the standards of legitimacy and representativeness that many 
had hoped for: 
“The Emergency Loya Jirga did not meet the expectations of many 
Afghans, who hoped to elect a more representative government in 
addition to the president. Some delegates and electors were intimi-
dated or pressured by leaders who retained personal control over 
militias and who distributed massive funds from foreign sources or 
illicit activities”.195 
The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the 
Emergency Loya Jirga196 mandated with its preparation produced un-
clear procedural rules and, in violation of the Bonn Agreement,197 re-
leased these only one day before the commencement of the Emergency 
Loya Jirga.198 The participants were thus not given the opportunity to 
familiarize themselves with the process, resulting in several days with-
out an agenda, chaotic speakers’ lists and delegates not knowing what, 
when or how to decide issues.199 1,051 of the delegates, who repre-
sented a diverse mixture of all political, religious and ethnic groups in 
Afghan society, were elected nationwide by 15,000 electoral persons, 
who had themselves been elected within their districts.200 This group 
was supplemented by 550 delegates appointed to ensure representation 
of weaker sections of society, such as refugees, women, minorities, no-
mads and handicapped persons.201 
However, this process was not entirely free of intimidation and vio-
lence.202 The requirement of the Bonn Agreement203 that armed factions 
                                                           
195 B.R. Rubin et al., Building a New Afghanistan: The Value of Success, the 
Cost of Failure, Center for International Cooperation, NY University, 
2004, 22 et seq. 
196 Section IV Bonn Agreement.  
197 Section IV (3) Bonn Agreement had stipulated that the Commission would 
publish and disseminate the rules and procedures of the convening of the 
Emergency Loya Jirga at least ten weeks before its commencement. 
198 C. Johnson et al., see note 194, 15. 
199 Ibid. 
200 J. Vergau, “Manifest der Hoffnung: Über die neue Verfassung Afghani-
stans”, VRÜ 37 (2004), 465 et seq. (469). 
201 Ibid., 469, 470. The final number of female delegates was 160. 
202 For details see Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Afghanistan: Return 
of the Warlords, June 2002, 10, <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/ 
afghanistan/warlords.htm>. 
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should be withdrawn from Kabul was not implemented.204 Some out-
spoken candidates required protection, others could not return home 
due to personal threats made against them for their performance during 
the Emergency Loya Jirga. In addition, some of the 1,600 delegates 
were perceived to be appointed by various warlords and power bro-
kers205 or were themselves206 serving as military commanders and/or 
were accused of being complicit in human rights violations, both of 
which would have been criteria for ineligibility under the agreed upon 
procedure. While Hamid Karzai was elected as the head of the Afghan 
Transitional Authority207 by an overwhelming majority, and while his 
acceptability for office was not contested and has now been confirmed 
by the elections held in September 2004, this success was slightly 
tainted by the fact that President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay 
Khalilzad, reportedly pressured the former Afghan king Mohammed 
Zahir Shah to withdraw his nomination in favor of Karzai.208 In addi-
tion, the secret ballot, which was used for the election of the transi-
tional presidency, was abandoned for votes concerning the arrangement 
of the transitional government and its key personnel.209 There was no 
debate or proper vote on the composition of the next administration or 
on any plan or proposal for the design of the government.210 
A number of key cabinet figures confirmed by the Emergency Loya 
Jirga are believed to be responsible for war crimes and are deemed un-
acceptable by many Afghans.211 The fact that the international commu-
nity deals with these individuals across a wide range of civilian issues, 
despite the fact that the rules of the Emergency Loya Jirga excluded 
their eligibility for public office, serves to accord them a legitimacy that 
                                                           
203 Annex I. 4. Bonn Agreement.  
204 Especially a large number of troops loyal to defense “minister” Fahim con-
tinues to remain in the city until today. 
205 A. Saikal, “Afghanistan after the Loya Jirga”, Survival 44 (2002), 47 et seq. 
(48). 
206 Examples are General Dostum (deputy defense minister in the Interim Au-
thority and a regional leader of the north of Afghanistan), Gul Agha Sher-
zai (the governor of Kandahar), Haji Abdul Qadir (the governor of Nan-
gahar), and Ismail Khan (the governor of Herat). 
207 The name was later changed to Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. 
208 Saikal, see note 205, 48. 
209 HRW Report, see note 202, 10. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Johnson et al., see note 194, 1. 
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many Afghans find offensive.212 This has implications not only for the 
security, but also for the ability of the state to raise revenue, and for 
broader perceptions of legitimacy.213 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that despite all the problems, the 
Emergency Loya Jirga was the first moderately democratic forum in 
which differences could be aired and women were given the opportu-
nity to participate in building the foundations for future democratic 
processes. It did not end in a deadlock or in violence, a result that 
would not have come as a surprise to many observers. In light of the 
last 23 years of warfare and lack of public participation in governmental 
processes on the state level, the Loya Jirga represents a traditional Af-
ghan mechanism that is largely accepted and respected by the Afghan 
people, giving them a much stronger sense of ownership of the recon-
struction process than an imposed UN transitional administration 
could ever have done. 
2. Constitutional Process 
The next step towards permanent institutions, as outlined by the Bonn 
Agreement,214 was the convening of a Constitutional Loya Jirga within 
18 months of the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Authority in 
order to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan. To prepare the way, 
a nine-member Constitutional Drafting Commission was appointed on 
5 October 2002, which developed a plan for the constitution-making 
process and a draft constitution. The Constitutional Drafting Commis-
sion, which was made up of technical drafters rather than political ac-
tors,215 passed on their results to the 35 members of the Constitutional 
Review Commission.216 The draft of the Constitutional Review Com-
mission was finally passed to the Constitutional Loya Jirga that 
                                                           
212 Ibid., 13, also fn 34. 
213 Ibid., 12, 13. 
214 Section I (6) Bonn Agreement. 
215 Johnson et al., see note 194, 15. 
216 For a comprehensive overview of the constitutional process including the 
relevant documents and drafts, refer to the comprehensive website of the 
Constitutional Commission, <www.constitution-afg.com>. 
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adopted the new Constitution217 on 4 January 2004. It became opera-
tive once Karzai had signed it on the 26 January 2004. 
a. The Drafting Process 
The drafting process itself was characterized by heated discussions be-
tween reformers and more conservative political and religious actors.218 
The resulting draft draws on the substantive content of past Afghan 
constitutions,219 but offers a modern legal framework for the recon-
struction and the establishment of the rule of law. 
Unlike the constitutional drafting processes in some other war-torn 
countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina,220 where there were strong for-
eign influences, the drafting of the new Afghan constitution was an 
                                                           
217 A link to the text of the Constitution is available at: <http://www.idlo.org/ 
AfghanLaws/Laws%201921_todate.htm>. 
218 Vergau, see note 200, 471 et seq. 
219 Previous constitutions were: 1747-1923 “customary constitution”; 1923 
first written constitution under Amanullah, whose reformist and secular 
outlook led to widespread revolt and the removal of the king; 1931 consti-
tution under Nader Shah, which largely retracted the liberal advances and 
re-established the role of religion; the 1964 constitution, considered quite 
modern and liberal, drafted as the result of the “Palace Revolution” of Za-
her Shah who had dismissed his prime minister (and cousin and brother-in-
law) Daoud the previous year and re-asserted royal power under prime 
minister Dr. Yousouf; in 1973 Daoud then toppled the king and proclaimed 
the republic, leading in 1977 to the first republican constitution; after the 
Communist coup d’état of 1978 and the Soviet invasion one year later a 
Constitutional Declaration was proclaimed in 1980, followed by a full con-
stitution in 1987; in an effort to appease the opposition, the Najibullah 
government issued a Constitutional Revision in 1990; the 1992 Peshawar 
Accords effectively abrogated this constitution and established the Islamic 
State of Afghanistan, which can thus be considered a constitutional docu-
ment in its own right, containing relatively detailed provisions about the 
structure of the government; in 1993 a draft for an Islamic Constitution 
was commenced under President Mujaddidi, and finalized as the Basic 
Principles of the Islamic State under Rabbani, but never formally adopted; 
the Taliban who came to power in 1996 likewise never adopted a formal 
constitution. For a comprehensive treatment see Bachardoust, see note 53; 
Moltmann, see note 50; Vergau, see note 200. 
220 E. Sarcevic, “Völkerrechtlicher Vertrag als Gestaltungsinstrument der Ver-
fassunggebung: Das Daytoner Verfassungsexperiment mit Präzendenzwir-
kung?”, AVR 39 (2001), 297 et seq. (299 and seq.). 
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overwhelmingly “Afghan” process. A strong indicator is the fact, that 
the text was originally drafted in Dari while the UN had to provide un-
official English translations for its own use and that of the international 
experts permitted to see the draft at a later stage.221 The Constitutional 
Drafting Commission222 developed this first text mainly on the basis of 
the constitution of 1964, but also incorporated some aspects of the 
newer constitutions of 1977, 1987 and 1990.223 This first draft was then 
given to the Constitutional Review Commission,224 which in turn re-
viewed the text and showed it to a few international experts and the 
government’s National Security Council.225  
The Constitutional Review Commission worked closely together 
with only three foreigners: Barnett R. Rubin of the United States of 
America, Yash Pal Ghai of Kenya and Guy Carcassonne of France.226 
Many more international experts offered advice on specific issues,227 
such as the role of Islam, the options of a Constitutional Court for Af-
ghanistan, the unitary versus the federal state structure option, the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of a presidential, parliamentary or mixed 
system, the division of powers between the executive and the legislature 
as well as women’s rights, to name but a few. However, while the UN 
insisted on introducing a measure of public consultation in the drafting 
process and Brahimi saw the UN’s role as assuring that the constitution 
would create a “workable” form of government and conform to basic 
international standards,228 foreign technical assistance was kept to a 
minimum because of concerns that the Constitution would appear to be 
                                                           
221 See B.R. Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution”, Journal of Democracy 15 
(2004), 5 et seq. (note 3 on page 19). 
222 For a detailed documentation of the process see Secretariat of the Constitu-
tional Commission of Afghanistan, The Constitution-Making Process in 
Afghanistan, Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 2003, <www. 
constitution-afg.com/drafting_comm.html>. 
223 See in detail Vergau, see note 200, 467 et seq. Vergau in particular laments 
the failure to draw upon the more progressive elements of the 1978, 1980, 
1987, and 1990, instead relying almost exclusively on the 1964 constitution. 
224 A list of the members of the Constitutional Review Commission can be 
found at: <www.constitution-afg.com/review_comm.html>. 
225 See Rubin, see note 221, 10. 
226 Ibid, note 2 on page 19. 
227 Some of the papers presented to the Commission are available under: 
<www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflict_translations.html>. 
228 See Rubin, see note 221, 10. 
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written by non-Afghans.229 Nonetheless, a UNAMA Constitutional 
Commission Support Unit was created that, with the agreement of the 
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Secretariat, had the 
primary responsibility for coordinating international technical and fi-
nancial support for the Project.230 UNDP was to assist the constitu-
tional process by providing financial management, administrative and 
operational support.231 To increase legitimacy among Afghans, the Se-
cretariat of the Constitutional Review Commission developed a public 
consultation strategy.232 
By way of written submissions, oral submissions and question-
naires, input was to be collected from the public over a period of two 
months in all 32 provinces and from the refugees in Iran and Pakistan. 
Among others, issues such as the role of religion, national unity, official 
languages, protection of minorities, the type of governmental system, 
separation of powers, qualifications for public office, the Loya Jirga 
mechanism and more were to be addressed. In addition, the Afghan 
people were invited to bring up any other issue they believed should be 
considered in the constitutional drafting process.233 To help in this 
process, the UN and NGOs provided personnel and training courses. 
The objective was to educate selected community leaders in basic con-
stitutional issues necessary to carry out the consultation process and to 
enable them to train others for this process.234 In view of the wide-
spread rate of illiteracy, the short time-span previewed for this public 
consultation exercise and the limited resources, as well as the effective-
ness of this process can be criticized.235 While the theory of the consul-
tation process was commendable, in practice it did not function as ex-
pected due to a number of factors, including planning deficits by 
                                                           
229 ICG Asia Report No 56, Afghanistan’s flawed constitutional process,  
12 June 2003, 15, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1639& 
l=1>. 
230 F. Wardak, The Management of the Constitution Making Process in Af-
ghanistan, Constitutional Review Commission, 1 et seq. (5), <http:// 
www.constitution-afg.com/resrouces/First%20article.doc>. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Secretariat Constitutional Review Commission, Public Consultation Strat-
egy, <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflict_translations.html>. 
233 G.R. Roashan, Afghan Constitution Building Exercise, Taking the Case to 
the People, 5, 6, <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflict_translations. 
html>. 
234 Ibid., 5. 
235 Ibid., 5, 6. 
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UNAMA.236 The actual draft of the constitution – with the changes in-
corporated at every stage of the drafting process – was not published 
during the consultation process, and was finally made public on 3 No-
vember 2003, barely a month before the scheduled opening of the Con-
stitutional Loya Jirga that was to finalize the draft.237 
b. The Constitutional Loya Jirga  
The Constitutional Loya Jirga, however, was more successful than ex-
pected. Security and organization did not pose as many problems as 
during the Emergency Loya Jirga and debates over important issues did 
take place.238 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission pre-
pared a very detailed framework for the Constitutional Loya Jirga, 
which reflected the legal framework laid down in a Presidential Decree 
of 24.04.1382 (15 July 2003) and which laid out in detail the necessary 
criteria for the selection of candidates, the timeline for consultations 
with the society and registration of candidates, the election and the 
roles and responsibilities of delegates, as well as the necessary interac-
tion with international agencies that helped in the preparation of the as-
sembly.239 
The final draft of the Constitution was presented to the Constitu-
tional Loya Jirga that convened on 14 December 2003, consisting of 502 
delegates, of which the majority was elected and about 50 were ap-
pointed.240 Among others, 64 female delegates, i.e. two from each prov-
ince, 24 delegates representing the refugees in Pakistan and Iran, 9 dele-
gates representing the nomads, and 3 delegates representing the Hindu 
and Sikh minorities were elected by the groups they respectively repre-
                                                           
236 ICG Asia Report No. 56, see note 229, 15-20. 
237 Rubin, see note 221, 10. 
238 For details concerning the debated issues see Rubin, see note 221, 5 et seq. 
and Vergau, see note 200. 
239 See the “Constitutional Loya Jirga Framework”, <http://www.unama-
afg.org/docs/docs.htm>. 
240 For the details concerning the convention and procedures of the Constitu-
tional Loya Jirga, see the Presidential Decree on the Convening of the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga of 15 July 2003, the Rules of Procedure, and the 
official Afghan “Draft Constitution Fact Sheet”, <www.unama-
afg.org/docs/docs.htm>.  
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sented.241 The President appointed the rest, of whom 25 were to be legal 
experts and 25 were to be women.242  
In addition, the following people participated as observers: cabinet 
members (33), the Chief Justice, members of the Constitutional Review 
Commission (35), the Chairpersons of the Independent Human Rights 
Commission and the Judicial Reform Commission. Apart from these 
observers the following people were ineligible: governors, deputy gov-
ernors, district administrators, or mayors; staff members of the Secre-
tariat of the Constitutional Commission; employees of the police, 
armed forces, and the National Security Directorate.243 
There were some reports about voter and candidate intimidation,244 
and this has been acknowledged even by insiders sympathetic to the 
process: “Afghanistan was and is not a place where a show of hands at a 
meeting can decide who will hold power”.245 Given the clear inability 
of the Karzai government to assure security for voters and candidates, 
the government and the UN thus considered it best to keep the content 
of the constitutional deliberations confidential until a thoroughly vetted 
text could be presented to the public and the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Loya Jirga.246 Clearly, this approach compromises normative 
standards of democratic participation and notions of popular sover-
eignty, but it can be argued that it was defensible given the danger of the 
process being “hijacked” by radical agendas.247 Nevertheless, the de-
bates at the Constitutional Loya Jirga were extremely spirited with 
most substantive debate focusing on the choice between a purely presi-
dential or a mixed system with a president and a prime minister248 rely-
                                                           
241 Vergau, see note see note 200, 469. 
242 Ibid. 
243 The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission, Framework for the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga, see note 239. 
244 See for instance the open letter by Human Rights Watch sent to President 
Karzai on 29 October 2003 to this effect, <hrw.org/press/2003/10/ 
afgnaistan102903-ltr.htm> (NB! the spelling mistake in the URL is inten-
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245 Rubin, see note 34, 8. 
246 Ibid. 
247 The normative debate that arose in the context of the aborted electoral vic-
tory of the Algerian Islamicist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) is compara-
ble to the dilemma posed here. 
248 The first option was strongly advocated by the Pashtun delegates whose 
ethnic majority status gave them a natural monopoly over the post of 
president; for the same reason the other ethnic groups strongly opposed a 
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ing on a parliament-approved cabinet; the question of dual citizenship 
for cabinet ministers, i.e. the role returning diaspora Afghans were to 
play in the future;249 the place of Islam in the legal system and the de-
nomination of the country as an Islamic Republic; as well as the posi-
tion of minorities and women. 
c. The Constitution 
The Constitutional Loya Jirga adopted the 162 articles of the Afghan 
Constitution on 4 January 2004. The result is a constitution establishing 
a presidential system with a bicameral parliament, a highly centralized 
administration, strong minority rights250 including rights for minority 
languages and a comprehensive catalogue of human rights. A federal 
option had been debated,251 but was abandoned for a number of rea-
                                                           
purely presidential system as a recipe for ethnic domination. The Northern 
Alliance, and in particular the Shura-yi Nazar within it, resisted the push 
towards presidentialism, but in the end its two leading figures, defense 
minister Fahim and education minister Qanooni, took different positions 
due to diverging personal ambitions. The former aspired to become sole 
vice-president under Karzai while the latter claimed the prospective pre-
miership. The Americans strongly favored a strong presidency because 
they considered it to be a more stable form of government, thereby assur-
ing them of a reliable point of contact. Most of the last minute changes to 
the draft prior to its publication concerned precisely this debate over presi-
dentialism vs. parliamentarism. See Rubin, see note 34, 10 et seq. 
249 At the time it most concerned the American-Afghan finance minister Dr. 
Ashraf Ghani and interior minister Ali Ahmad Jalali. The compromise 
worked out at the time of the adoption of the constitution, namely that 
parliament (the House of the People) can opt to approve a candidate de-
spite his foreign citizenship did not help those ministers nominated by 
Karzai after his election in 2004 because there is as yet no parliament to ap-
prove them under article 72 (1). A number of senior officials have refused 
to serve as ministers due to this constitutional requirement that under the 
present circumstances would have required them to renounce their adopted 
citizenship. Personal communication with senior Afghan officials, Febru-
ary 2005. 
250 J. Desautels-Stein, “Rites and Rights in Afghanistan: The Hazara and the 
2004 Constitution”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 29 (2005), 157 et 
seq. 
251 Inter alia: O. Zakhilwal, “Federalism in Afghanistan: a recipe for disinte-
gration”, Federations, special issue on Afghanistan, Oct. 2001, 11 et seq.; D. 
Cameron, “Overview: A role for federalism in Afghanistan after the Tali-
ban, Federations, special issue on Afghanistan”, Federations, special issue on 
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sons. While some believed it would solve some of the problems caused 
by warlords and ethnic divisions,252 others said that the prerequisites 
for a successful federal system were not given at the time of the drafting 
of the constitution.253 The argument brought forth most often was that 
Afghanistan needs a strong central government because federalism 
would lead to disintegration:254 
“[I]n a country like Afghanistan, where illiteracy is abundant, the 
economy is in shambles and land and other natural sources are not 
evenly distributed across the country, federalism would lead to war-
lordism, personal fiefdoms, no respect for the central government 
and a continuation of internal war – this time over who gets 
what”.255 
Another argument against a federal solution was the fear of more in-
terference in Afghan affairs from the neighboring countries, especially 
as the Iran-backed Hezb-i-Wahdat of Khalili and the Uzbekistan- and 
Russia-backed Junbish-i-Mili of General Dostum called for federal-
ism.256 In response to these fears, article 1 of the Afghan Constitution 
now reads “Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, independent, unitary 
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254 Marshall Qasim Fahim, Vice President and Minister of Defense, Afshraf 
Ghani, Minister of Finance at the Loya Jirga, Gul Agha Shirzai of Qanda-
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Malikyar/ Rubin, see note 251, 41. 
255 Zakhilwal, see note 251, 12. 
256 Ibid. 
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and indivisible state”. The head of state is a strong President, who ap-
points his cabinet with the approval of the National Assembly.257 In 
consideration of the special role Loya Jirgas as a traditional mechanism 
have played in decision-making processes in Afghanistan, the Constitu-
tion contains special regulations concerning the Loya Jirga “as the 
highest manifestation of the people of Afghanistan”.258 The Loya Jirga 
has the competence to amend the Constitution, prosecute the President 
and decide on issues “related to independence, national sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity, and supreme interests of the country”.259 
While the Constitution takes into consideration that there are many 
ethnic groups living in Afghanistan, it uses Islam as a strongly unifying 
factor, referring to it in many articles.260 Article 2 of the Constitution 
defines Islam as the religion of the state, but at the same time deter-
mines that: “Followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith 
and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of 
the law.”261 Furthermore, the Constitution explicitly states that the na-
tion of Afghanistan is comprised of the various ethnic groups,262 and al-
lows the languages of these ethnic groups to be the third official lan-
guage, next to Pashtu and Dari, in those areas where the majority 
speaks them.263 
Discrimination of any kind is prohibited.264 This prohibition is a 
part of the human rights catalogue contained in Chapter Two of the 
Constitution that also determines the duties of the citizens.265 These 
rights can be enforced by the strong judiciary, headed by the Supreme 
Court,266 and are protected in their continuity by article 149 II Afghan 
Constitution that determines that “[t]he amendment of the fundamental 
rights of the people is only permitted to make them more effective”. A 
Constitutional Court is not envisaged, the Supreme Court having the 
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competence to review the constitutionality of laws, legislative decrees, 
and international treaties.267 
What influence article 3 of the Constitution, which states that: “[i]n 
Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the 
sacred religion of Islam”, will have on the legal reality and human rights 
in Afghanistan remains to be seen and will be strongly dependent on 
the judiciary.268 Furthermore, it needs to be pointed out that the most 
egregious instances of human rights violations are either the result of 
arbitrary violence committed by military commanders, or come about 
through the application of tribal law. With regard to the former it must 
be said that the pertained religious or secular nature of the legal system 
will have little impact on such abuses, as only the effectiveness of law 
enforcement will affect impunity and thus the prevalence of violations. 
With regard to tribal law, however, it can be argued that classical Is-
lamic law with its very strict procedural safeguards and clear stipula-
tions and rights regimes, for instance in family and personal status law, 
would actually constitute a progressive advance in rights protection. 
This is not an apologetic argument about the perceived compatibility of 
Islamic law with international standards, which we think cannot be 
maintained. Yet, compared to the legal reality dominated by tribal law, a 
significant progressive potential for Islamic law cannot be doubted.269 
The lack of an explicit reference to the Shari’a or a specific school of 
Islamic law270 in art. 3 of the constitution allows the assumption that 
                                                           
267 Article 121 of the Afghan Constitution. 
268 R. Wolfrum/ E. Afsah, Stellungnahme zum afghanischen Verfassungsent-
wurf, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law of 4 November 2003. 
269 Ibid. For concurring views see Vergau, see note 200; Toscano/ Drury, see 
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270 Article 130 stipulates that for filling lacunae of the law, the judiciary should 
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schools of law, and that there is no normative hierarchy between them is an 
entirely uncontroversial proposition among students of fiqh (Islamic juris-
prudence). For essentially political reasons, namely a subverted version of 
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the authors of the Constitution aimed at confirming the Islamic charac-
ter of the state, rather than binding the state organs to the Shari’a. The 
final text of the constitution is a modern constitution that is in confor-
mity with international human rights standards and which provides a 
legal structure that will aid the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. 
3. Elections 
After the new Constitution had been passed, the Bonn Agreement pre-
viewed that by June 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections 
would end a two and a half year political transition process.271 The 
transitional regulations contained in the new constitution272 define the 
end of the transitional phase as the point in time in which the new Na-
tional Assembly is inaugurated. In view of the many prerequisites to a 
parliamentary election, such as developing the complete legal frame-
work for these elections, completing the first population census in 25 
years necessary to determine the number of National Assembly seats in 
each province as well as provincial and district council membership, 
demarcation of district boundaries, registration of eligible voters, public 
                                                           
the Jacobin nation-state grafted upon notions of the Islamic identity of the 
nation, coupled with perceived necessity to prevent legal pluralism derived 
from the civil law tradition, many Islamic states have traditionally at-
tempted to legislate the exclusive validity of any one school at the expense 
of all the others. Needless to say, such attempts have been extremely un-
popular with followers of minority denominations, both because it was 
perceived to be discriminatory but also because on dogmatic grounds such 
measures are difficult to defend due to the hierarchical equality of all 
schools in classical fiqh. Article 131 has in this context been hailed as a ma-
jor breakthrough, not only in Afghan legal tradition but compared with 
other regional constitutions. It stipulates essentially the validity of Shiite 
personal status law for disputes involving members of that minority, as well 
as referring to Shiite jurisprudence in cases of lacunae in the law. There is 
some debate about the relationship between article 130 and 131, in particu-
lar the extent to which the two are self-executing, and whether article 131 
applies only after recourse to Hanafi jurisprudence according to article 130 
has yielded no satisfactory result, or whether in the case of a lacuna re-
course should directly be had to Shiite jurisprudence. The resolution of 
these questions is difficult to discuss in abstracto, and needs to be seen in 
the light of future stance taken by the Afghan judiciary. 
271 Section I Bonn Agreement. 
272 Article 159 of the Afghan Constitution. 
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awareness campaigns, the formation and registration of political parties, 
and more, it did not come as a surprise that the presidential and parlia-
mentary elections273 were not held at the same time as had originally 
been planned.274 Instead, it was decided to hold presidential elections at 
an earlier stage because by their nature they were easier to organize and 
conduct, as no political parties or large numbers of local candidates 
needed to be managed. Furthermore, President Karzai had made it clear 
that he was not willing to stay over the period previewed by the Bonn 
Agreement, an understandable choice given Afghanistan’s modern ex-
perience.275 It was therefore decided to hold parliamentary elections at a 
later date. It is only with the successful election and inauguration of the 
National Assembly that the transitional period laid down in the Bonn 
Agreement will come to an end, thereby also ending a period marked 
by the absence of a real separation of powers – a problem that many 
transitional governments are faced with. 
a. Presidential Elections 
Before the Presidential elections actually took place on 9 October 2004, 
the UN carried out a voter registration exercise which resulted in the 
registration of 10.5 million Afghans.276 Pursuant to the Afghan request 
for assistance regarding the preparation, organization, conduct and su-
pervision of the first electoral process, yet with regard to the light foot-
print approach, the elections were organized by the Joint Electoral 
Monitoring Body (JEMB), a joint commission made up of international 
experts and the Interim Afghan Electoral Commission.277 The JEMB 
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momentarily exercises all the functions later reserved for the Independ-
ent Electoral Commission, but its functions will lapse upon the end of 
the transitional period.278 
Many observers believed the election time-table established by the 
Bonn Agreement was far too ambitious279 and that the lack of security 
throughout the country would prevent successful elections. Some be-
lieved that even if the elections were formally successful, they may be 
devoid of meaning in the sense that they may not reflect the realities of 
power and authority, and thus may not result in a stable and sustainable 
government.280 Now the results of the presidential election give hope 
that the parliamentary election will also be more successful than ex-
pected. The presidential election held on the 9 October 2004 was 
plagued by certain logistical problems, such as the failure to mark vot-
ers with indelible ink in some polling booths, poor training of election 
staff, as well as incidences of intimidation. Nevertheless, an independ-
ent international team, charged by the UN with examining fraud, has 
certified the election’s credibility.281 
Part of the success may be attributed to the fact that some of the po-
tential spoilers in the peace process, warlords with their own militias, 
were integrated into the official process and were given the opportunity 
to run as presidential candidates. There has been criticism because the 
international community, in the form of the international members of 
the JEMB mandated with examining the formal suitability of the presi-
dential candidates,282 allowed certain individuals in command of unoffi-
                                                           
278 Article 2 of the Presidential Decree No. 110 of 18 February 2004. The end 
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279 For example, ICG Afghanistan Briefing, The Afghan Transitional Admini-
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280 B.R. Rubin, “(Re) Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democ-
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Chopra, “The road ahead: political and institutional reconstruction in Af-
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282 See article 6 (i) Regulations for the Nomination of Candidates for the 
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cial militias to run for President despite being formally ineligible.283 
However, it can be argued that these decisions may have helped to sta-
bilize the institution-building process. Had these individuals been ex-
cluded from the formal process, it is not improbable that they would 
have resorted to violence. By being allowed to run as candidates, they 
were given the chance to compete within the process, instead of being 
forced to contest it from without. Although there had been fears of at-
tacks by anti-Government elements, no major security incidents oc-
curred.284 This was not only due to the presence of ISAF, but also due 
to the successful role of the budding Afghan police force and the Af-
ghan National Army in providing security and order during the presi-
dential election, despite limited resources and training opportunities.285 
Concerning the reflection of real power structures it can be said that 
this election was not merely a rubber stamp election, but that Karzai’s 
legitimacy has been strengthened. A number of warlords previously 
part of the Transitional government have now been ousted and replaced 
by reformers and technocrats in the new cabinet sworn in by the Af-
ghan President Hamed Karzai on the 24 December 2004.286 The ap-
pointment of some cabinet members was not uncontroversial, especially 
the appointment of the former governor of Herat as the new minister of 
energy. This has been criticized not only because his lack of qualifica-
tion for the post envisaged calls into question the meritocratic nature of 
government service, but also because his continued control of irregular 
militias and his past responsibility for a variety of human rights viola-
tions is perceived to send out the wrong signals of impunity.287 
Given the relative weakness of central governmental institutions, it 
is, however, difficult to establish how President Karzai could avoid in-
tegrating forces that may otherwise be in a position to aggravate the se-
curity situation within the country. The absence of a strong military 
force loyal to the central authorities in Kabul and the Afghan Constitu-
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tion brings with it the necessity of appeasing and accommodating ir-
regular power-brokers until unofficial forces have been disarmed and 
demobilized. In accordance with arts 161 and 71 of the Afghan Consti-
tution, the cabinet will still have to be approved by the National As-
sembly once it has been elected. Until that time, Karzai and his two vice 
presidents are free to act without scrutiny by the National Assembly. 
b. Parliamentary Elections 
The parliamentary elections that were already postponed to April 2005, 
have once more been postponed and are now scheduled to take place on 
18 September 2005, but even then the upper house will only be tempo-
rary as the necessary elections of the district councils will not take 
place.288 Not only do security issues have to be addressed more thor-
oughly, but a myriad of legal and administrative preparations are still 
necessary, such as the demarcation of district boundaries, the definition 
of the powers and responsibilities of the provincial and district councils, 
the education of voters and candidates about the forthcoming elections, 
and the preparation of facilities and legal instruments for the National 
Assembly and the councils. 
Among other activities, the international community is helping the 
Afghan authorities prepare for this event through the Support to the 
Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL) project.289 The main 
actors involved are the Afghan Civil Service Commission, the French 
government and UNDP. This project aims to put in place the necessary 
stable democratic foundations for the Afghan legislature and will, inter 
alia, establish a secretariat to the parliament and train secretariat staff to 
work effectively to support the new parliamentarians, many of whom 
will be coming from isolated Afghan rural areas with no knowledge of 
or previous experience in such a body. Once the National Assembly has 
been inaugurated, one of the first tasks will be to review the decrees 
passed in the transitional phase and approve the Ministers appointed by 
President Karzai.290 Given the absence of a viable parliamentary tradi-
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tion in the country, and given the fact that the existing political parties 
are not based around a political program but along ethnic lines, strong 
apprehension exists about the functioning of the new parliament. In 
particular, the fact that almost all parties are linked to one or the other 
of the armed factions allows for the possibility of parliamentary dis-
putes potentially spilling over into armed confrontations. There are ex-
amples of military movements transforming themselves effectively into 
political groupings that use the parliamentary system effectively, and 
are fairly loyal to the rules of the game;291 just as there are examples of 
political wings of military factions that survive the demise of the mili-
tary struggle and become effective political parties.292 However, the 
question whether parliamentary norms and codes of conduct will take 
hold, and, more importantly, whether parliament will be able to func-
tion as an institution within the overall structure of government, i.e. be-
yond mere partisan identities and interests, cannot be answered at the 
moment. 
V. Further Obstacles to the Reconstruction Process 
As is the case in all post-conflict situations, problems arise that impede 
the reconstruction process. Some are specific to the given conflict and 
arise out of its particular history, culture, geography and society; others, 
in contrast, are likely to appear in all post-conflict situations. In Af-
ghanistan, obstacles that should be pointed out are the lack of finances 
for the reconstruction process, the security problem arising from vari-
ous factors, narcotics, transitional justice, the influx of foreigners into 
the capital, as well as the unresolved demobilization issue. 
1. Financial Commitments 
Until Afghanistan has surpassed its present transitional period, and 
long beyond that, the reconstruction process that is currently being co-
ordinated by UNAMA will require the continued assistance of the in-
ternational community, not the least in financial terms. To meet the 
immediate financial needs of the Interim Authority, UNDP established 
the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund immediately after the conclu-
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sion of the Bonn Agreement.293 The first contributions of donor coun-
tries were to be used to establish work places for the Interim Authority 
and to pay the salaries of the Afghan civil servants. 
The donor conferences held in Tokyo in mid-January 2002 and in 
Berlin in April 2004 have helped define the broad outlines for peace-
making and reconstruction in Afghanistan. For the Tokyo Confer-
ence,294 UNDP, World Bank and the Asian Development Bank pre-
pared a Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction 
for 2002-2006, which included estimates of the reconstruction costs and 
helped prioritize funding through donor countries. At the same confer-
ence, a comprehensive Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program 
for the Afghan People 2002 (ITAP) was presented that had been pre-
pared after consultations with the international community as well as 
Afghan and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
In Berlin,295 the implementation of the Bonn Agreement was evalu-
ated in a Progress Report and the process of reconstruction was further 
shaped by a Work Plan of the Afghan Government. At the conference 
the Afghan government presented a consolidated budget based on the 
combined expertise of more than 100 international experts working in 
close consultation with the respective government organs and in coop-
eration with UNAMA, UNDP, the World Bank, and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank. The report presented to the international donor commu-
nity entitled Securing Afghanistan’s Future296 laid out the financial re-
quirements for bringing Afghanistan along the road to sustainable re-
covery. The report argues that US$ 27.5 billion in aid over a period of 
seven years will be required, including US$ 6 billion going directly to 
the government budget. 
Acknowledging that it would be impossible for donor governments 
to make that kind of financial commitment over the projected time 
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frame, the Afghan government made much more modest requests: seek-
ing an acknowledgment that success will require a sustained commit-
ment of approximately that order of magnitude over time; a political 
commitment to provide about US$ 12 billion of support over three 
years; and pledges of US$ 4.5 billion for the coming year.297 
These figures seem enormous if looked at in isolation, but look 
much more modest if compared to the financial and military efforts ex-
pended in other post-conflict situations.298 There is little doubt that de-
spite the high political priority accorded to its reconstruction, the “level 
of foreign assistance Afghanistan has received so far appears to be on 
the low side compared to other recent post-conflict cases”.299 This sen-
timent of the IMF is echoed by the former US Special Envoy to Af-
ghanistan, James Dobbins, who maintains that Afghanistan is “the least 
resourced, large-scale American reconstruction program ever”.300 If we 
start from the assessment contained in Securing Afghanistan’s Future as 
a realistic estimate of the needs, then the amounts pledged by the donor 
community fell far short,301 especially if we take into account that the 
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“bulk” of assistance has gone towards humanitarian aid which, unlike 
reconstruction aid, has only a marginal impact on the prospect of sus-
tainable development.302 
The costs of reconstruction appear outright miniscule in comparison 
to the enormous outlays for the ongoing military campaign, whether 
looking at the expenses of ISAF303 or the Coalition.304 More impor-
tantly, as Rubin et al. point out, the cost of failure is prohibitive, espe-
cially if one factors in the rising cost of military and security-related 
expenses if the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates again to pre-2001 
levels.305 They lay out three different scenarios of donor commitment, 
namely fulfilling the needs assessment contained in Securing Afghani-
stan’s Future over a seven year period with much reduced funding avail-
able until 2016 and beyond; continuing the present limited engagement 
unchanged; and, finally, drastically reducing reconstruction aid in the 
next two to three years due to donor fatigue. In the latter two scenarios 
the likely military costs of answering the security challenge of an inter-
nally insecure Afghanistan will be prohibitive. 
2. Security and Narcotics 
Other issues that pose serious hurdles for the reconstruction process in 
Afghanistan are security and narcotics. A study examining civil wars 
found that half of the countries that settle civil wars with peace agree-
ments revert to violence within five years.306 Two main factors are re-
sponsible: the accessibility of resources that can easily be looted or ex-
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tracted from the population through various forms of “taxes”, “cus-
tom” duties, etc., and the persistence of unofficial armed formations.307 
All conflicts offer certain economic incentives to some sections of 
the population, in particular the need of the parties to the conflict to fi-
nance the struggle often leads to the adoption of illicit but lucrative ac-
tivities that can be taxed or exploited directly.308 In Afghanistan the 
production, processing, and smuggling of opium has fuelled the armed 
conflict and in the past provided an important source of revenue to 
armed factions protecting and taxing it, as well as the individuals di-
rectly involved with the production. While all factions engaged in the 
narcotics trade throughout the conflict, the vacuum left by the depar-
ture of the Taliban has led many warlords to assert control over parts of 
the country and to use that physical control to extract revenue. 
Three related factors have led to the massive increase in opium pro-
duction since 2001: first, the opium trade is by far the most lucrative ac-
tivity in present-day Afghanistan, so warlords have used it as a way to 
collect revenue, both for personal enrichment and to pay for their mili-
tias; secondly, the central government remains unable to police the 
country effectively, thereby leaving the producers and traffickers with 
very little to fear; last, but not least, the Coalition has focused on fight-
ing terrorist groups, diverting manpower to engage effectively in anti-
narcotics has been considered inexpedient; furthermore the Coalition 
often depends on the collaboration of the very same warlords suspected 
of complicity in the narcotics trade. It can likewise by no means be as-
sumed that the members of the central government have no personal 
involvement in the narcotics trade.309 
Given the extreme poverty of Afghanistan, and the way interna-
tional aid is disbursed, income from narcotics actually constitutes an 
enormous percentage of GDP: combined farmers’ and traffickers in-
come from opium amounted to 52 per cent of GDP in 2002.310 Fur-
thermore, the impressive-looking levels of international assistance pales 
into relative insignificance if compared with the income from drugs: aid 
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disbursement (as opposed to mere pledges) in the two years 2002-2003 
had been US$ 2.9 billion; in the same period the yearly income from 
drugs was US$ 2.3 billion. The figures become even more alarming if 
we keep in mind that a very large percentage of the foreign aid is spent 
on overheads, consultancy salaries, etc. and thus does not benefit the 
Afghan population directly.311 Of the annual drug money, in contrast, 
about US$ 1 billion goes directly to the farmers, and the remaining US$ 
1.3–1.5 billion to those power holders that compete with the govern-
ment institutions in the provinces.312 
The danger of narcotic production becoming endemic and eventu-
ally subverting the establishment of institutions is palpable and has, if 
anything, grown in recent years. Several high-ranking officials have 
been warning about the creation of a “narco-state”313 dominated by 
violence, an illegitimate economy, and with all the negative domestic 
and international implications that might occur. The present production 
figures are nothing short of catastrophic, with Afghanistan producing 
an estimated 87 per cent of the world’s opium.314 
3. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and 
 Transitional Justice 
In the course of reconstruction and rehabilitation a question that will 
also have to be addressed is not only the amelioration of the still worry-
ing human rights situation, but also the issue of post-conflict justice. 
Over three decades, the Afghan people have had to suffer severe human 
rights violations: summary executions, elimination of political oppo-
nents, torture, suppression of minorities, forced marriages with Taliban 
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fighters, rape, murder and more.315 The Commission on Human Rights 
has emphasized the necessity of developing a strategy to support the 
victims of political violence to come to terms with their past.316 
Generally, options could include a Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission, the prosecution of war criminals, financial compensation, edu-
cational measures, sanctions of a non-penal character, as well as general 
institutional reforms.317 Both the new Constitution and the Bonn 
Agreement lack norms that could form a legal framework for the devel-
opment and implementation of a strategy for transitional justice. How-
ever, the Presidential Decree of 2 June 2002 on the Establishment of the 
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) states that 
the AIHRC “shall as well undertake national consultations and propose 
a national strategy for transitional justice and for addressing the abuses 
of the past.”318 The positive aspect to be seen in the lacunae of legal in-
struments to address this issue is the fact that amnesties for war crimi-
nals or other factors hampering transitional justice arrangements are not 
envisaged.319 
The AIHRC, which is presently the only institution that is seriously 
engaged with this issue, is to function in accordance with the “Paris 
Principles”, contained in the annex to A/RES/48/134 of 20 December 
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1993.320 Most importantly, the AIHRC is to fulfill its tasks independ-
ently of the government. In the field of human rights, the AIHRC is to 
function parallel to the formal court system and other institutions. The 
Constitution321 contains the right of “any person, whose fundamental 
rights have been violated” to file a complaint, and previews that the 
AIHRC can “refer cases of violation of human rights to the legal au-
thorities, and assist in defending the rights of the complainant”. The 
Presidential Decree mentioned above extends this mandate to include 
the task of actively advancing the transitional justice process. 
The AIHRC was only able to commence its work six months after it 
had been established, and one year after the Bonn Agreement it still did 
not have the means to effectively do its work.322 In the meantime, the 
AIHRC has more than 300 employees in its offices in Kabul and the 
provinces.323 It has been able to begin work concerning children’s 
rights, women’s rights, human rights, and monitoring.324 Furthermore, 
the AIHRC has attempted the daunting task of developing a strategy 
for transitional justice as envisaged in the Presidential Decree of 2 June 
2002. To determine which measures should be adopted to begin the 
process of transitional justice and aid the peace building process, the 
AIHRC has already completed the national consultation stipulated in 
its mandate. The concept of a “light-footprint approach” of the UN has 
also been applicable in this area, as the international community only 
assisted the AIHRC that for its part relied on the input of the Afghan 
population to develop a strategy for transitional justice. The report325 
that was prepared as a result of the consultation process includes rec-
ommendations for the government, the international community and 
civil society. The national strategy outlined in the study was developed 
after holding about 200 focus group discussions with over 2000 partici-
pants and questioning 4151 random individuals in 32 provinces and 
                                                           
320 See in this respect article 15, Annex One of Decree of the Presidency of the 
Interim Administration of Afghanistan on the Establishment of an Afghan 
Independent Human Rights Commission, 06/06/2002. 
321 Article 58 II and III Afghan Constitution. 
322 HRW Report, see note 202. 
323 Report, see note315, 15. 
324 Report, ibid. 
325 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, A Call for Justice, A 
National Consultation on past Human Rights Violations in Afghanistan, 
February 2005 <www.aihrc.org.af/>. 
Max Planck UNYB 9 (2005) 446 
refugees in Pakistan and Iran.326 The strategy encompasses non-judicial 
acts conveying commitment to justice, as well as the more concrete 
proposals of a combination of vetting, institutional reform and meas-
ures leading to individual prosecution.327 
Taking into consideration both the present lack of adequate domes-
tic capacities for complex prosecutorial or judicial proceedings, as well 
as the preference for trials to be held in Afghanistan, the AIHRC pro-
poses the establishment of a Special Prosecutor’s Office in two years 
and the establishment of a War Crimes Chamber in three years.328 Only 
those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes or having committed 
serious crimes are to be prosecuted.329 While the majority of the par-
ticipants also called for reparations and some kind of truth-seeking 
mechanism, a precise approach in this regard could not be articulated 
due to the lack of information.330 However, the AIHRC also recom-
mends the establishment of a legal framework enabling the victims to 
bring civil suits against perpetrators for compensation.331 In line with 
the idea of Afghan ownership of the process, the role envisaged for the 
international community is a supportive one: the recommendations 
mainly focus on the need for political and financial support, technical 
assistance as well as expertise.332 So far this has been provided by 
UNAMA supporting the AIHRC in all its activities. 
The hurdles that are still in place for the implementation of the con-
frontational aspects of such a strategy are evident. There is a glaring 
lack of the legal capacity that would be required to construct and im-
plement the legal framework. Furthermore, the financial resources that 
would be necessary to implement any strategy of transitional justice are 
tremendous and, in view of the lack of priority given to this issue until 
now, would be difficult to come by. Lastly, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the political context would make the implementation of many of 
the suggested measures extremely difficult. Most obvious is that the 
threat of prosecution of individuals, who have the capacity to act as po-
tential spoilers but have so far been kept at bay by integrating them into 
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the reconstruction process, may destabilize the peace process. Many 
who could be negatively affected by some of these measures – whether 
judicial or non-judicial – are in positions of power and have every in-
terest in preventing the implementation of a transitional justice strategy. 
Questionable also is whether the local population would be willing 
to provide the necessary information for truth mechanisms or judicial 
proceedings. In the face of threats that may come from the affected 
warlords or other powerful individuals, it is not unlikely that many will 
remain silent. There is not only a lack of public trust in national judicial 
institutions to perform the task of national reconciliation as such,333 but 
also a more general lack of trust in state structures, which also arises 
from the fact that some known perpetrators of human rights violations 
still hold governmental positions334 and human right abuses are ongo-
ing.335 SRSG Brahimi has referred to “the fear that is in the heart of 
practically every Afghan because there is no rule of law yet in this 
country”.336 The report of the AIHRC was thus met with skepticism 
by some and downright hostility by those who could potentially be af-
fected.337 Nonetheless, few would disagree that long-term political sta-
bility in Afghanistan can only be achieved if a reconciliation process to 
resolve past grievances is conducted at some point.338 Considering that 
69 per cent of the respondents of the survey claimed that either they or 
a family member had been a victim of human rights violation,339 at least 
symbolic acts340 appear in order to build trust among the Afghan popu-
lation in the political will of state actors to initiate a process of transi-
tional justice. The national consultation was a first step in the right di-
rection and the process should be continued with both financial and po-
litical support from the international community. However, choosing a 
mechanism for national reconciliation which takes into consideration 
Afghan culture and its history will be vital if the process is to succeed. 
                                                           
333 UNDP Human Development Report 2004, see note 17, 152. 
334 AIHRC, see note 325, 11. 
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4. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
a. Conceptual Issues 
A number of key UN documents have reflected the increasing impor-
tance attached to DDR, starting with Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for 
Peace341 which for the first time accorded institutional recognition of 
the importance of integrating arms control – mainly mine removal and 
the demobilization of former combatants – into peace operations.342 
The Agenda was generally a very optimistic document, reflecting the 
hope of the international community that the end of the Cold War 
would herald a return to the effective collective security system origi-
nally envisaged in the Charter. The Agenda thus criticizes traditional 
peace-keeping as born out of the strictures of a polarized world and an 
incapacitated UN and argues for complementing it with more active 
peacemaking and peacebuilding.343 In line with the still prevailing Cold 
War mode of thinking, there is an emphasis on disarmament through 
ending the supply of weaponry and physically removing small arms and 
land mines.344 
The 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,345 written after the 
                                                           
341 Report of the Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace - Preventive Di-
plomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111 of 17 
June 1992. 
342 For a succinct overview over the development of UN doctrine on this issue 
see United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, An 
Agenda for Peace Ten Years On, July 2004, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ 
reform/initiatives/ghali/2002/0203ten.htm>. 
343 Agenda, see note 341, paras 42-45, where he effectively calls for the imple-
mentation of the provisions of Arts 42 and 43 UN Charter. The issue of fi-
nally activating the Military Staff Committee and some form of standing 
UN army was actively discussed at the time. For a good overview of the 
debate see A. Roberts/ B. Kingsbury, United Nations, Divided World, 
1993. 
344 Agenda, see note 341, Section VI Post-conflict Peace-building, especially 
paras 55 and 58. 
345 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United  
Nations, Doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1 of 3 January 1995; also available at: 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html> (accessed on 2 May 2005). 
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failures of Bosnia and Somalia,346 is generally more realistic about the 
challenges posed by complex emergencies and acknowledges that dis-
armament is not simply a matter of cutting of supply. Proposing the 
term “micro-disarmament”,347 it still betrays its intellectual heritage in 
the arms control movement of the Cold War, but it addressed at length 
the difficulty of stemming the flow of small arms and land mines over 
porous borders, and removing them from within a restive population 
and in difficult terrain.348 Nevertheless, it continued to see the issue as 
primarily a proliferation issue, not a sociological one, i.e. did not accept 
that it is the combatants not the arms in themselves that are the prob-
lem. This element is explicitly recognized in the 2000 Report of the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations349 which states that: 
“the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former com-
batants — key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced like-
lihood of conflict recurrence — is an area in which peacebuilding 
makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order. 
But the basic objective of disarmament, demobilization and reinte-
gration is not met unless all three elements of the program are im-
plemented. Demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) 
will tend to return to a life of violence if they find no legitimate live-
lihood, that is, if they are not ‘reintegrated’ into the local econ-
omy”.350 
The report goes on to argue that the importance of having an inte-
grated approach to all three aspects of the DDR process should be re-
flected in the funding structure of peace-keeping operations.351 Subse-
quently, DDR has featured prominently in the 2001 Report on the Pre-
vention of Armed Conflict,352 the 2003 Interim Report on the Preven-
                                                           
346 See in this respect the contributions by K. Oellers-Frahm and C. Philipp, 
in this Volume. 
347 See note 345, para. 60. 
348 Ibid paras 61-65. 
349 Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809. See also Doc. A/55/502, Report of the Secre-
tary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations. 
350 Ibid., para. 42, emphasis added. 
351 Ibid., paras 42-46, 47 (c).  
352 Report of the Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, Doc. 
A/55/985-S/2001/574 of 7 June 2001, paras 83, 93, 102, 127, Recommenda-
tion No. 15. In response to which the Security Council adopted 
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tion of Armed Conflict353 as well as in most post-conflict operations.354 
b. DDR in the Afghan Context 
As we have noted before, the Afghan settlement was idiosyncratic in 
many respects, not least with respect to the settlement of the military 
conflict between the warring factions. The Bonn Agreement did not 
mark the end of a long political process but rather the beginning of 
transition. Furthermore, it accompanied rather than ended the decisive 
military conflict. The Northern Alliance, which was allied with the 
American-led Coalition against the Taliban government, as well as a 
host of other armed formations that collaborated in the subsequent 
fight against remnants of al Qaeda, enjoyed a privileged position in the 
transition process. These units were not only not subject to demobiliza-
tion, but continued to receive active military and financial support by 
the Coalition while remaining outside the purview of the central gov-
ernment. The stipulation of the Bonn Agreement that all armed factions 
would come under the command and control of the Interim Author-
ity355 already fell short of the usual requirement of post-conflict DDR 
because it did not require actual demobilization but “merely” the reor-
ganization into national armed forces. Even this limited requirement, 
however, has not been met by many militias allied with the Coalition. 
Various other aspects also obstruct the DDR process in Afghanistan. 
After having been involved in an armed conflict for over two decades, 
there is a lack of confidence in the state institutions to ensure a secure 
environment.356 In view of the present lack of a viable Afghan security 
force,357 the resurgence of warlords,358 the instability of the state,359 and 
                                                           
S/RES/1366 (2001) of 30 August 2001, note particularly para. 13 regarding 
the illicit flow of small arms. 
353 Doc. A/58/365 -S/2003/888. 
354 For an overview of UN action in this respect see the UN website Preven-
tive Action and Peacemaking, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/ 
fr_preventive_action.htm>. 
355 Section V (1) Bonn Agreement. 
356 Özerdem, see note 43, 967. 
357 M. Sedra, New Beginning or Return to Arms? The Disarmament, Demobi-
lization & Reintegration Process in Afghanistan, Bonn International Center 
for Conversion, 2003, 8, <http:www.bglatzer.de/arg/arp/sedra.pdf>  
358 M. Sedra, The Cost of Complacency, Afghanistan’s Faltering Peace-
Building Process, Foreign Policy in Focus, March 2003, 1, 
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an apparent deterioration of the security situation,360 this fear is not 
surprising. This goes hand in hand with a cultural context in which it is 
normal to own guns.361 Furthermore, while there have been indications 
of a substantial economic recovery over the last few years, there is an 
unequal distribution of wealth and the majority of the Afghan popula-
tion would be classified as poor.362 Some combatants will believe that 
giving up the gun means giving up one’s livelihood. In terms of both 
disarmament and reintegration, the drug trade is a hindrance. It is not 
only a lucrative option for an ex-combatant,363 but the porous borders 
and the financial potential of poppy trade also provide possibilities for 
rearmament.364 
c. International Support for DDR 
In line with the strategic importance attached to DDR in UN doctrine, 
UNDP and UNAMA have jointly launched Afghanistan’s New Begin-
nings Program (ANBP)365 to support the Ministry of Defense in the 
implementation process. The DDR process in the form of the ANBP, 
which is mainly being financed by Japan as the lead nation in DDR, was 
not launched until 2003366 after several proposals and efforts had 
failed.367 By February 2005 about 70 per cent of the estimated Afghan 
Military Forces (AMF) personnel were reported to have been dis-
                                                           
<http://www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/OUS0303afghanrebuild.pdf>; UNDP, Af-
ghanistan National Human Development Report 2004, see note 17, 52. 
359 UNDP Human Development Report 2004, see note 17, 52. 
360 Rubin, et al., see note 195, 10, 11; M. Sedra/ P. Middlebrook, Afghanistan’s 
Problematic Path to Peace: Lessons in State Building in the Post.-September 
11 Era, Foreign Policy in Focus, March 2004, 3, 7, <http://www.fpif.org/ 
papers/2004afgh-stbuild.html>; UNDP, Afghanistan National Human De-
velopment Report 2004, see note 17, 52, 53. 
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362 UNDP Human Development Report 2004, see note 17, 29-36. 
363 Rubin, et al., see note 195, 14; ICG, Asia Briefing No. 35, see note 47, 8. 
364 Özerdem, see note 43, 967. 
365 For information, in particular up to date data on decommissioning figures, 
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366 Ibid., 11; Report of the Secretary-General, see note 160, para. 16. 
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No. 65, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, 30 September 
2003, 8 and seq. 
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armed.368 These figures, however, overstate the success of the DDR 
process because – as we have already indicated earlier – the ANBP’s 
mandate covers only those units recognized as AMF units by the Min-
istry of Defense,369 which leaves out substantial numbers of armed 
groups. These illegal units370 could possibly be strengthened by de-
commissioned AMF combatants – some of whom continue to enjoy the 
support of the Coalition – which would further impede the efforts of 
the central government to extend state authority beyond Kabul.371 Al-
though there appear to be plans to launch a new program aimed at dis-
arming these illegal armed groups, a specific strategy has not yet been 
decided upon.372 At the moment these private militias are considered 
the country’s greatest danger.373 
The initial lack of initiative and effective measures from the interna-
tional community has not helped the DDR process.374 The Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the UN did not gain sup-
port from the US for the withdrawal of heavy weapons and military 
forces from Kabul until the end of 2003.375 The necessary Presidential 
decree providing for the cantonment of all AMF heavy weaponry by 
the Ministry of Defense with the assistance of the ANBP, was not is-
sued until 27 March 2004.376 Originally, the cantonment of heavy 
weaponry had not even been included in the ANBP. In addition, not a 
single country sent military observers or monitors for the disarmament 
and demobilization of militia units, and until 2002 the US refused to in-
volve Coalition forces in DDR, thereafter confining their role to a po-
litical one.377 
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d. Critique of the International Effort 
Considering the relative pace of disarmament, a successful nationwide 
DDR requires the presence of a neutral armed force.378 A DDR pro-
gram cannot be implemented in a security vacuum379 where the state or 
a supporting international force has no authority. Especially in areas 
with rival factions, each side will only be willing to disarm if there is a 
neutral (and effective) security force that will protect them until the 
DDR process has been fully completed by all sides.380 ISAF could po-
tentially perform this function, but to do this, its mandate has to be ex-
tended even further to allow more significant presence beyond Ka-
bul.381 
The most important obstacle for DDR originating from the interna-
tional community, however, is the fact that while efforts are being made 
to ensure a stable peace-building process, a “war on terror” is still being 
fought in Afghanistan. In the face of the military operations being con-
ducted in the pursuit of al Qaeda, the assumption that all international 
actors involved aim for total disarmament of Afghan militias does not 
hold true.382 Immediately after September 11, the Northern Alliance re-
ceived large amounts of money from the US which was intended to se-
cure allegiance for Operation Enduring Freedom and enable rearma-
ment.383 The US-led Coalition has utilized regional warlords and power 
brokers as proxies in the fight against the Taliban, effectively returning 
large parts of the country to the status quo before 1996.384 
In the process, militia leaders have not only frequently managed to 
subvert DDR with the tacit support of the central government and/or 
the Coalition,385 but they have also been empowered militarily and 
economically by the US-led Coalition, thereby helping them to resist 
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central government control.386 Some of the local and regional com-
manders whom the US Coalition forces have supplied with weapons to 
assist in the campaign against al Qaeda have been implicated in past war 
crimes and have used these arms to equip militias for their own political 
purposes.387 With the “war on terror” being conducted at the same time 
as a DDR strategy is being implemented, the chances of success for the 
latter appear to be very bleak. 
VI. Conclusion 
From the moment the Taliban regime was ousted by the US-led mili-
tary campaign, the number of international actors influencing the re-
construction process in Afghanistan has multiplied. Nonetheless, in 
comparison with many other countries where the UN has played a sig-
nificant role in the peacemaking and reconstruction process, due to Bra-
himi’s light footprint approach, the Afghan authorities are more ac-
tively involved in all aspects. Without doubt, ensuring security will be 
an absolute prerequisite for the establishment of a functioning democ-
ratic state in adherence of the rule of law. This aspect will be decisive 
for the reconstruction process and is momentarily encumbered by a 
number of factors. 
On the one hand, there is the problem of warlords who control 
wide areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul. Thus, there is no state mo-
nopoly of power – a problem that is exacerbated by the opposing goals 
of the US-led Coalition forces still in the country and the NATO-led 
ISAF. While ISAF is mandated with peace building and ensuring the 
implementation of the Bonn Agreement, the US-led Coalition forces 
are fighting a “war on terror” that sporadically requires working with 
regional warlords, thereby undermining the central government.388 The 
warlords hamper the establishment of security in a number of ways: 
they obstruct demobilization of their militias, some finance themselves 
through the narcotics trade, and they dominate processes of conflict 
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resolution that prevent the growth of an independent judiciary in their 
areas. 
The Coalition strategy of winning warlords in the fight against ter-
ror undermines in several respects the efforts of the international com-
munity to support a functioning central government. While Coalition 
leaders pay lip service to the strategic aim of a strong Afghan state, they 
allow short-term tactical considerations often to trump this aim. The 
United Nations’ effort in Afghanistan has deliberately concentrated on 
building Afghan capacity and enabling local governmental and adminis-
trative structures to develop. Thus, the strategic vision of the UN and 
the Coalition might not necessary be at odds, but important divisions 
exist at the level of tactical implementation. 
Despite these difficulties, the UN has tried to avoid some of the pit-
falls of earlier missions by insisting on an integrated approach to plan-
ning and operational implementation. UNAMA has been given the task 
of coordinating not only the work of all the other UN agencies active in 
the field, but, equally important, of ensuring that the lead nations which 
have been given the main responsibility for specific activities in the se-
curity sector389 do so under an integrated strategic vision and with suf-
ficient Afghan input and ownership. 
While the role of the UN is thus, of necessity, an important one, 
UNAMA as its chief representation has made an effort to prevent 
evolving into a parallel government rivaling the authority of the Afghan 
administration. Despite the enormous disparities in financial resources, 
human capital and experience, and operational capacity, UNAMA has 
generally resisted the temptation390 to sidestep the government and 
simply provide the kind of services that are necessary but which the 
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Afghan civil service is, as yet, unable to make available. It has, by and 
large, also done a good job in ensuring that bilateral donors and NGOs 
likewise do not undermine local capacity by creating parallel structures. 
Taking into consideration the many negative factors hampering the 
effort to build local capacity and ownership and to coordinate compet-
ing institutional, political and military interests, UNAMA has managed 
admirably well to nurture Afghan ownership in the reconstruction 
process. While it is highly likely that major obstacles will continue to 
beset the reconstruction effort, it is doubtful whether any other ap-
proach by the UN would have had the same positive effects that we see 
now. 
Some of the most fundamental institutional prerequisites for the 
continuation of the reconstruction process and the gradual creation of 
the rule of law are now in place: most importantly, the adoption of a 
modern constitution that enjoys widespread legitimacy and which is 
moderately liberal without alienating the more conservative sections of 
society, a major fault of earlier projects of constitutional social engi-
neering. Related important steps have been the election of a legitimate 
government in reasonably free and fair elections, setting a precedent 
that will hopefully hold. It must, however, be said, that this success 
story can only be continued if the international community remains 
willing to provide the necessary political, institutional and financial 
support. Should the UN withdraw before the country has been stabi-
lized, it is very likely that Afghanistan will fall back into a state of in-
ternal conflict, whose ramifications will probably not remain limited to 
Afghanistan alone. 
